



































The Distribution of Economic Resources




This paper investigates the redistributive impact of private and public child-
care provision and education on children’s resources in Germany between 2009
and 2013. It takes account of the multidimensionality of children’s needs and
access to economic resources by applying an extended income approach. Com-
bining survey data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) with administra-
tive data from the German Federal Statistical Office, extended disposable in-
come inequality is found to be significantly lower than disposable cash income
inequality at the five percent level across all years. However, the extension
does not significantly change distributional trends. At the same time, publicly
provided childcare and schooling notably decrease inequality among children
such that it cushions cash income inequality. One major reason for this effect
is that public in-kind benefits profit children living with single parents, which
are deprived in terms of cash incomes, most. This gives additional evidence
on the importance of publicly provided childcare and schooling as a policy in-
strument to equalize economic resources and opportunities in children’s lives.
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1 Introduction
Family constellations have tremendously changed over the past decades in Germany
and other industrialized countries (McLanahan, 2004; Peuckert, 2012). In 2012, al-
most every fifth German child grew up in a single parent household (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2013). At the same time, these are the children who face the highest
risk of income poverty (Bundesministerium fu¨r Arbeit und Soziales, 2013). But
they are not only deprived in terms of disposable cash income: in many cases, they
are also time-poor (McLanahan and Percheski, 2008). It is well investigated that
both parental income and parental time investments are positively correlated with
children’s well-being and the development of a child’s human capital (Heckman and
Mosso, 2014).1 Thus, children from low socio-economic backgrounds tend to accu-
mulate disadvantages in several dimensions during their childhood which negatively
affect their employment prospects and income opportunities later in life.
A key policy instrument to mitigate the disadvantages experienced by children
from low socio-economic background is the provision of child-related public in-kind
benefits, such as public childcare and education. On the one hand, it frees par-
ents’ time from indispensable childcare and it allows them, especially single parents,
to work for pay in the labour market. This might help to cushion disadvantages
in parental income and time since employment is a crucial factor to escape income
poverty. On the other hand, high quality public childcare and education can function
as a close substitute to parental childcare time. At its best it has a large positive ef-
fect on the formation of children’s cognitive and socio-emotional skills that exceeds
the capabilities of parents, especially for children from low socio-economic back-
ground. At least, it helps to reduce some disadvantages that are due to different
parental skills, incomes, and parenting styles (Mu¨ller et al., 2013). Indeed, Heck-
man (2008) can show that children from lower socio-economic backgrounds profit
from publicly provided childcare services by enhancing their social development and
cognition.
Therefore, disposable cash income alone appears to be an incomplete measure
of children’s well-being and access to economic resources (also see Aaberge et al.,
2010; Garfinkel et al., 2006, for a more general critique). Accordingly, an extended
income concept is derived in this study which incorporates children’s disposable cash
income as well as the monetized value of parental and public childcare and education
to receive a more complete measure of children’s well-being and access to economic
1Human capital includes skills and abilities, personality, appearance, reputation, and appropri-
ate credentials (Becker and Tomes, 1986)
1
resources.
An early and prominent paper that applied an extended income definition is
Jenkins and O’Leary (1996) for the United Kingdom.2 They investigate the impact
of extending the cash income of households by the imputed value of household
production time to consider the overall amount of economic resources. Estimating
the distribution of extended income amongst non-elderly, one-family households in
1986, they find a substantially lower level of inequality in the distribution of extended
income compared to disposable cash income, while overall inequality trends are
similar. Furthermore, changes in the income distribution due to the extension of
the income concept shift singles down the distribution relative to married couple
families.
Frick et al. (2012) investigate the impact of home production on economic
inequality for Germany. Their main finding is that extending cash income by the
monetary value of home production has an inequality reducing effect independent
of the evaluation technique and inequality measure used. Hence, their findings for
Germany show the same patterns as the results of Jenkins and O’Leary (1996) for
the United Kingdom. Recent U.S. studies have also found substantial inequality
reducing effects if the monetary value of home production is taken into account
(see, e.g., Gottschalk and Mayer, 2002; Zick et al., 2008; Frazis and Stewart, 2011).
However, Frick et al. (2012) neither investigate the differences between family types
nor do they consider the effects of both home production and in-kind benefits.
Moreover, they do not put a special emphasis on children’s available resources. This
gap shall be closed by this study. Nevertheless, they show that childcare activities
constitute a major part of home production whenever a household has children.
Therefore, the expected transfers from parental childcare time are likely to be large
among families with dependent children.
Another large strand of literature deals with the evaluation of public in-kind
benefits, such as public education, public health services, or public housing, and
investigates its distributional impact on disposable incomes (recent studies are, e.g.,
Garfinkel et al., 2006; Paulus et al., 2010; Koutsampelas and Tsakloglou, 2013; Hig-
gins et al., 2015).3 In general, all studies find substantially lower levels of disposable
income inequality whenever the income concept is extended by the value of pub-
lic in-kind benefits. In particular, pre-school and primary education is found to
2Other early empirical studies are Bryant and Zick (1985) or Bonke (1992), among others. See
Frick et al. (2012) for a comprehensive overview of previous studies on evaluating home production.
3Previous studies on the impact of public in-kind benefits are, amongst others, Ruggles and
O’Higgins (1981); Le Grand (1982); Gemmell (1985); Smeeding et al. (1993); Evandrou et al.
(1993); Ruggeri et al. (1994); Slesnick (1996); Antoninis and Tsakloglou (2001).
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have a disproportionately high equalizing effect on the distribution of disposable
income across countries (see, e.g., Antoninis and Tsakloglou, 2001; Paulus et al.,
2010; Higgins et al., 2015).
So far and to the best knowledge of the author, there is no study that incor-
porates both the value of public in-kind benefits and parental childcare time into
an extended income concept. This paper contributes to close this gap by putting
special emphasis on the available resources of children in Germany and, thus, pro-
vides a more complete measure of children’s current well-being and opportunities
in later life. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
data sources used and shows how the income components under analysis are defined
and measured. In Section 3, level and distributional effects of extending the income
definition are discussed and robustness checks are performed. Finally, in Section 4,
the results are summarized and conclusions are drawn.
2 Data and Measurement of Extended Income
2.1 Data
The analysis is based on data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) which is an
annually repeated survey among German households.4 It includes a broad range
of demographic and socio-economic characteristics for all years since 1984. East
German households are included in the panel since 1990. Every year, approximately
11,000 households participate in the SOEP which correspond to 20,000 individuals
(Wagner et al., 2007; Schupp and Rahmann, 2013). The sample includes East and
West German children and information about their parents. In this study, children
are defined as individuals aged 13 or below living with their parents.5 In 2014,
the SOEP was extended by information from the SOEP-related study ”Familien
in Deutschland” (Families in Germany, FiD) which was launched in 2010. This
additional survey covers more than 4.500 households every year and puts a special
focus on single parents, families with more than two children, low-income families,
and families with very young children in the German population (Schro¨der et al.,
2013). Therefore, it increases the analytical power of the SOEP for the purpose of
this study tremendously. However, the availability of the FiD also determines the
4DOI: 10.5684/soep.v31.1
5The age restriction is set in accordance with the legal definition of a child provided by the
German law for the protection of the youth (§1).
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investigation period which is limited to the survey years 2010 to 2014.6
Furthermore, the panel survey data is extended by official statistics provided
by the German Federal Statistical Office. In particular, information on yearly expen-
ditures on public schooling per pupil are provided for each federal state on an annual
basis, including elementary and secondary schools (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015).
Public spending is defined on grounds of a ’basic funds’ (Grundmittel) concept where
revenues generated by a service (e.g. kindergarten fees) are netted out of the overall
spending on that same service (e.g. kindergartens). In addition, public spending
comprise expenditures on employees and administrational staff including pensions
for civil servants, aid expenditures (Beihilfeaufwendungen), current operating ex-
penses and capital expenditures. This definition of public spending is comparable
to the OECD definition of spending on educational core services and is widely used
in economic studies evaluating the distributional impact of public in-kind benefits
(see, for instance, Garfinkel et al., 2006). Yearly expenditures on pre-school and
after-school care clubs per child, i.e. publicly provided or subsidized childcare by
cribs, kindergartens, nurseries, or childminders, are derived from combining infor-
mation on the number of children enrolled in the enumerated institutions and annual
total public spending on them (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2014a,b,c).7
2.2 Cash Income
Cash income is measured as real net equivalent household income including imputed
rents from owner-occupied housing.8 Net household income is the sum of a house-
hold’s labour earnings, asset flows, private retirement income, private transfers,
public transfers, and social security pensions minus total household taxes and social
security contributions. Disposable cash income is equivalized using the modified
OECD scale to account for different household sizes and composition.
2.3 Net Monetary Value of Public Childcare and Education
The net monetary value of public childcare and education is derived by a standard
production cost approach. This approach is based on the assumption that the value
6The survey years 2010 to 2014 correspond to the income years 2009 to 2013 which are referred
to throughout the paper. This is due to the retrospective collection of income information: all
incomes in survey year t refer to income year t-1.
7Data on the number of children in said institutions is generally available from 2006 onwards.
8Further details on the computation of imputed rent can be found in Frick and Grabka (2001)
and Frick and Grabka (2003).
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of public childcare provision and education is as high as the costs of providing it
(Aaberge et al., 2010; Garfinkel et al., 2006). Variation in the value of publicly
provided childcare and education is obtained by differences in geographical regions,
in school types, and in the age of children. This also implies that the value of in-kind
benefits is otherwise the same for all children no matter of where their position in
the income distribution actually is. Hence, a limitation of this study is that existing
differences in the quality and efficiency of childcare provision and education cannot
be factored in fully. However, the largest differences are likely to occur at the federal
state level in Germany, since education policy is determined at this stage, which are
covered by the data available.9 In this respect it is assumed that children living in
the same federal state and attending the same educational level receive a similar
amount of non-cash income from public childcare and education.
Data on public spending on childcare and schooling is provided by the German
Federal Statistical Office on an annual basis for each federal state (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2014a,b,c, 2015). Average annual public expenditures on childcare per
child is calculated as the sum of public expenditures on cribs, kindergartens, after-
school care clubs, and other forms of publicly subsidized day care divided by the
total number of children consuming these services in each federal state.10 Average
annual public expenditures on schooling per pupil are defined as the sum of public
expenditures on publicly funded primary and secondary schools divided by the total
number of pupils enrolled in these institutions. All expenditures are expressed in
2010 Euro and, thus, might slightly differ from official statistics which states nominal
per capita spending.11
Since the educational in-kind benefit is consumed by the receiving child only
and cannot be shared within the household, no further equalisation of the mone-
tary transfer is done (see, e.g., Garfinkel et al., 2006, for a similar argumentation).
Therefore, a child’s extended income includes the full value of public childcare and/or
schooling which is added to the equivalized disposable cash income and the mone-
9There are further differences in the quality and efficiency of public childcare and education
between and within federal states that are not well explained just by the different levels of per
capita spending between federal states. In this respect, Wo¨ßmann (2005, 2010, 2016) shows that
there is a negative correlation between per capita spending and class size, but smaller class sizes
do not automatically cause better pupil performances. Highly qualified teachers and more flexible
institutional settings are rather explaining differences in performance levels between and within
countries. Unfortunately, better performance indicators are not available for this analysis.
10Whenever a child received part-time care in the respective year of observation, yearly public
expenditures on childcare are divided by two (this is commonly done; see, for instance, Frick et al.,
2011)
11An overview of public spending on childcare and schooling by federal state is depicted in Tables
A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix.
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tary value of parental childcare time. The monetary evaluation of the latter will be
explained next.
2.4 Monetary Value of Parental Childcare Time
Parental childcare time constitutes a major part of children’s resources that is not
reflected in the household’s cash income flow. While the value of this time for
children may differ on various dimensions, this paper will measure it in a single
dimension, namely a monetary one. The main challenge in quantifying the value
of parental childcare time is the absence of market prices. There are two widely
used approaches to derive (gross) hourly shadow wage rates for non-market workers:
(1) the housekeeper wage approach, and (2) the opportunity cost approach. Both
approaches mainly differ in their assumption on the underlying productivity of in-
dividuals; the housekeeper wage approach assumes that all individuals are similarly
productive, whereas the opportunity cost approach accounts for the heterogeneity
in the productivity of individuals.
Both approaches rely on information on parental childcare hours on an average
weekday which is the second crucial determinant of the monetary value of parental
childcare time.12 Figure 1a gives a brief overview on the distribution of parental
childcare time on an average weekday between and within families. The majority
of parents spend two to five hours on their children on an average weekday.13 In
addition, parental childcare time within couples is unequally distributed between
parents (single parents excluded), as it is depicted in Figure 1b. Patterns have kept
quite unchanged over time and it is still women who do most of childcare activities
(see Figures A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix).
2.4.1 Housekeeper Wage Approach
The idea of the housekeeper wage approach is to assign a uniform hourly gross wage
rate to all parents doing childcare activities at home by themselves. Each parent is
assumed to be similarly productive such that differences in the productivity between
parents, or between skilled childcare workers and unskilled parents are neglected.
One way to derive the shadow price of parental childcare time is to use the average
gross wage rates of employees working in sectors that provide similar services in
12In the SOEP, respondents are asked how many (full) hours they spend on childcare on a typical
weekday. Information on the kind of parental childcare activities are not available such that an
hour of watching TV, doing homework, or reading together is evaluated similarly.
13The number of childcare hours is limited to eighteen hours per parent assuming parents to
spend at least six hours on recreation on an average weekday.
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Figure 1: Distribution of parental childcare time on an average weekday within and
between families, 2009-2013
(a) Between families (b) Within families (excl. singles)
Note: Restricted to families having children aged 13 years or below. Source: SOEP (v31.1), own calculations.
the market. Therefore, the housekeeper approach is comparable to a market value
approach, where the gross hourly wage rate is close to a market price.
Here, the shadow price of parental childcare time is derived from information
on the average monthly gross earnings of childcare workers (ISCO-88 code 5131) pro-
vided in the SOEP for each year. In particular, mean gross hourly wage rates are
calculated by dividing monthly gross earnings by the number of working weeks (fac-
tor 4.3) and actual weekly working hours.14 This is done for each year separately.15
The mean gross hourly wage rate is, then, multiplied by the hours of parental child-
care time on an average weekday.16 To receive the annual monetary value of parental
childcare time, the monetary value of parental childcare time on an average weekday
is multiplied by 258 working days (258days = 5days×4.3weeks×12months).17 The
annual gross income from parental childcare is not transformed into net values since
a comparable service would have to be paid at gross prices in the market as well
14Alternatively, information on agreed hourly gross wage rates of childcare workers and/or teach-
ers working in the public sector could be used. This would result in much higher gross hourly wage
rates than those derived from information on childcare workers in the SOEP. Therefore, the results
presented in Section 3 provide a lower bound for the distributional impact of the housekeeper wage
approach. However, sticking to the lower gross wage rates of childcare workers can also be justified
as an adjustment to the lower productivity of untrained parents compared to trained workers.
15Distinguishing between East and West Germany is not possible since the number of observa-
tions tends to be too small to receive reliable average gross hourly wage rates.
16An overview of observed and estimated hourly gross wage rates can be found in Tables A.7
and A.8 in the Appendix.
17National holidays, private vacation (the minimum statutory holidays could be subtracted),
and Saturdays are not considered as working days, since the vast majority of employees do not
have to work on those days and public childcare services and schools are normally closed. Hence,
parents face zero opportunity costs regarding the choice between paid and unpaid work.
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(see, for instance, Jenkins and O’Leary, 1996).
Another obstacle is the construction of equivalent one child households to
make children living in families of different size and composition comparable, i.e.
to eliminate all differences in the total time parents spend on childcare activities
on an average weekday that are only due to the different number of siblings and
adults living in the same household. For this purpose, yearly gross income from
parental childcare time, D, is equivalized using an adjusted version of the square
root equivalence scale: Deq =
D
pθ×sθ . It considers both the number of parents living
in a child’s household, p, and the number of siblings aged 13 years or below, s. The
parameter θ denotes an equivalence elasticity which is set to 0.5 to be in accordance
with the square root scale. The rationale behind this equivalence scale is twofold:
first, overall parental childcare does not increase proportionally with the number of
siblings. Second, some childcare activities are likely to affect all children at the same
time and some are devoted to a single child only. Since there is no specific time use
information on each child, these economies of scale in parenting are approximated by
applying the described equivalence scale. Finally, the annual equivalized monetary
value of parental childcare time is deflated to the base year 2010 and summed up with
the household’s real equivalized disposable cash income and the real net monetary
value of publicly provided childcare and education.
2.4.2 Opportunity Costs Approach
In contrast to the housekeeper wage approach, the opportunity cost approach allows
for heterogeneity in the productivity of individuals and measures the foregone earn-
ings that an individual with specific skills could have received in the labour market
instead of doing childcare at home by himself. A crucial assumption to be made
is that people can deliberately choose between working in the labour market or at
home to satisfy a given set of needs for childcare. Thus, the decision to work at
home or in the labour market depends on the individual’s earnings capacity and its
productivity in childcare. If parents have to work more hours in the labour market
to receive an income that is large enough to buy the same amount of childcare they
can provide on their own at home, they will choose not to work in the labour mar-
ket. However, this rests on the very strong assumption that individuals can freely
choose the amount of working hours in the labour market. Both assumptions are
challenged by the presence of labour market rigidities, for instance, fixed working
hours that are part of labour agreements (see Frick et al., 2012).
There are two widely used approaches to predict the shadow wage rates of home
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workers from the observable gross hourly wage rates of working age individuals: (i)
the standard OLS regression model as well as (ii) the Heckman selection correction
model. Selection correction controls for correlation between gross hourly wage rates
and unobserved characteristics that influence wages and the participation decision.
In both cases, a sample of private households is drawn from the SOEP to estimate
the shadow prices of parental childcare time. The sample is restricted to the working
age population (20-60 years) excluding all individuals who are still in education, in
military or community service, in apprenticeship including trainee- and internships,
who work as civil servants, who are pensioners (e.g. early retirement), and who help
in family business.
OLS Regression
First, a Mincerian OLS wage regression is applied to predict the shadow price
of parental childcare time (Mincer, 1958). This is done separately for each year and
sex (subscripts are left out for simplicity) estimating the following equation:
ln(w) = α + xβ + , (1)
where w is the gross hourly wage rate of an individual. The vector x contains
a broad set of commonly used covariates.18 The estimated coefficients are, then,
used for an out-of-sample prediction to derive the log of gross hourly wage rates
for all men and women in the respective years.19 Note that predicted wage rates
are used only if information on gross hourly wages is missing. After exponentiating
predicted log wage rates, they are multiplied with the hours of childcare activities
on an average weekday. These are then annualized for each parent and summed
up across all biological and non-biological parents living in the same household. A
household’s annual gross income from parental childcare time is, then, multiplied
by the household’s average tax rate to derive disposable incomes of this kind.20
18It is controlled for: age and age squared, full-time and part-time working experience as well
as their squared terms, schooling, vocational education, federal state, migration background, self-
rated health, marital status, the number of children younger than 6 years, and the location in
1989.
19One percent of predicted gross wage rates is truncated at each tail to reduce potential biases
from ill predicted outliers.
20A household’s average tax rate is estimated in two steps: First, a simultaneously quantile
regression of the log of a household’s annual direct tax and social insurance payments on a quadratic
in their log annual gross income is estimated. This is done for ten different income percentiles and
for each year separately. Second, the estimated coefficients are used to predict the ”adjusted”
annual tax and social security payments of a household according to the sum of the household’s
gross cash income and its estimated income from parental childcare (annual extended gross income).
Finally, a household’s average tax rate is calculated by dividing the ”adjusted” annual tax and
social security payments by the annual extended gross income.
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Disposable income from parental childcare time is finally equivalized using
the same equivalence scale as described in Section 2.4.1. The annual equivalized
disposable income from parental childcare time using the OLS estimation approach
is finally deflated to the base year 2010 and summed up with the household’s real
equivalized disposable cash income and the real net monetary value of publicly
provided childcare.
Heckman Selection Correction Model
In order to mitigate potential estimation bias due to self-selection into paid
work, a two-step Heckman selection correction model is estimated, too. The main
idea of this two-step approach is to include a correction term in the linear wage
regression that takes account of any correlation between unobserved factors influ-
encing both the decision to work and the level of observed gross wages. It is shown
in Wooldridge (2013) that this correction term depends on the inverse Mills ratio
which can be estimated from an unrestricted probit model:
Pr(s = 1|z) = Φ(zγ), (2)
where s is a binary response variable that is one if an individual is working
(s = 1[zγ + v ≥ 0] with v ∼ N(0, 1)), and zero otherwise. Φ is the cumulative
distribution function of the standard normal distribution, and the vector z contains
a wide set of covariates.21 The estimates γˆ from the Probit regression are, then,
used to compute the inverse Mills ratio λˆ = λ(ziγˆ) for each individual, i, working in
the labour market. In a second step, the restricted OLS wage regression of the form
y = xβ + u, with E(u|x) = 0 and y = ln(w), (3)
is extended by a correction term that depends on the inverse Mills ratio eval-
uated at zγ. As long as the correlated error terms are jointly normally distributed,
the conditional expectation of gross wages for persons working in the labour market
can, then, be estimated by:
21Covariates are: age and age squared, full-time and part-time working experience as well as their
squared terms, schooling, vocational education, federal state of residence, migration background,
and the location in 1989. In addition, self-rated health, marital status, and the number of children
younger than 6 years are used as exclusion restrictions such that they are assumed to only influence
the decision to work but not the level of earnings. This choice might be questionable, but it is widely
accepted that the number of dependent children and marital status are important determinants
for the choice to work, especially for women. Being mentally or physically ill is also very likely to
influence the ability to work more than the level of earnings due to anti-discrimination legacy.
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E(y|z, s = 1) = xβ + ρλ(zγ), (4)
where ρ denotes the correlation between the error terms u and v, w is the gross
hourly wage rate, and x is vector of covariates which is a strict subset of the vector z
excluding self-rated health, marital status, and the number of children younger than
6 years. All regressions are, again, estimated separately for each year and sex. The
estimated β coefficients are further used for an out-of-sample prediction to derive
the log of gross hourly wage rates for all men and women in the respective years.
Yearly equivalized disposable incomes are generated as described before in the OLS
chapter.22
3 Results
Extending the income definition by income from parental childcare time, and public
childcare and education has a remarkably large effect on both the level and distribu-
tion of children’s disposable income. Accordingly, I will first investigate the changes
in disposable income levels before describing the distributional impact of extending
the income definition.
3.1 Level Effects
Table 1 depicts the trends in children’s yearly mean real (equivalized) disposable
incomes between 2009 and 2013. First of all, mean real equivalized disposable cash
incomes have been quite stable over time. They slightly decreased from 20,805 Euro
in 2009 to 20,165 in 2013 which is a statistically insignificant decline of around
three percent (at the 5% level). In contrast, the mean real value of in-kind benefits
has increased by 4.8% over the same period: It was 4,880 Euro in 2009 (23.5%
of cash income) and 5,116 Euro in 2013 (25.4% of cash income). This increase
can be explained by two complementary developments: first, there was an increase
of single parent households in Germany which are more likely to demand public
childcare services, since they have to arrange market work and childcare without
the support of a partner.23 Second, there was a substantial expansion of publicly
22See Tables A.7 to Table A.9 in the Appendix for an overview of estimated hourly gross wage
rates according to the different approaches and for different subgroups. Again, note that predicted
wage rates are only used if information on gross hourly wages is missing. One percent of predicted
gross wage rates is truncated at each tail to reduce potential biases from ill predicted outliers.
23See also Bartels and Stockhausen (2016) for changes in family types and family resources in
Germany since the reunification.
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provided childcare in Germany during the last decade that was accompanied by a
greater willingness of parents to send their children to public childcare institutions.
The motives for the latter might originate from a change in role models as well as a
rising economic pressure on families which resulted in a higher demand for a second
earner and higher female labour market participation rates (see Schober and Stahl,
2014, among others).
Furthermore, the transfer added from parental childcare time is the largest and
was 11,314 Euro in 2009 and 10,261 Euro in 2013 (-9.3%) when using the housekeeper
wage approach.24 The decline is mainly explained by the evolution of the underlying
parental childcare hours which have gradually decreased over time, especially for
children living with married couple parents (see Table A.5 in the Appendix). This
declining trend could not be reversed by the simultaneous increase of the underlying
housekeeper wage rate, as it is depicted in Table A.7 in the Appendix. Applying
the two opportunity cost approaches instead yields similar results on lower levels:
The transfer added when using the OLS (Heckman) approach was 9,425 Euro (9,677
Euro) in 2009 and 8,912 Euro (9,508 Euro) in 2013. This is a decline of 5.4% (1.8%).
Nevertheless, annual equivalized incomes from foregone earnings still amount to 44%
(OLS) and 47% (HM) of equivalized disposable cash income in 2013, which highlights
the importance of considering income from non-market work in welfare analysis.
Finally, extended incomes are presented in the last three columns of Table 1.
The negative trends in disposable cash income, and income from parental childcare
also translate into a decline of total extended income which is only cushioned by
the rise of transfers added from public childcare and education. As a consequence,
total extended income has decreased from 36998 Euro in 2009 to 35,5542 Euro
in 2013 when using the housekeeper wage approach. This is a decline of around
four percent and, thereby, only slightly steeper than the change in cash income.
In contrast, applying the OLS approach (Heckman approach) gives a decrease of
extended income from 35,109 Euro (35,361 Euro) in 2009 to 34,194 Euro (34,790
Euro) in 2013. This is a change by around three (two) percent.
Table 2 shows the trends in yearly mean real (equivalized) disposable incomes
by component and family type between 2009 and 2013. Differentiating between
family type reveals that children living with single parents experience the lowest
mean real equivalized disposable cash income. On the other hand, children living
with single parents profit from in-kind benefits in absolute and relative terms the
24Note that income from parental childcare time is stated in gross terms when using the house-
keeper wage approach, since it is a market value approach. This mainly explains the observed level
differences compared to the results of the opportunity cost approaches which are net values.
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Table 1: Mean real disposable incomes by component, 2009-2013 (in Euro)
Cash In-kind HK wage Opp. cost appr. Total extended income
Year income benefits approach OLS HM HK OLS HM
2009 20,805 4,880 11,314 9,425 9,677 36,998 35,109 35,361
2010 20,668 5,252 10,803 9,763 10,145 36,724 35,684 36,066
2011 20,194 5,432 10,093 9,110 9,479 35,719 34,736 35,105
2012 20,710 5,495 9,958 9,319 9,783 36,163 35,524 35,988
2013 20,165 5,116 10,261 8,912 9,508 35,542 34,194 34,790
Note: All incomes and expenditures are measured in 2010 Euros. Disposable cash income is equivalized using the
modified OECD scale. Incomes from parental childcare time are equivalized using a modified square root scale.
In-kind benefits are not equivalized but measured on an individual basis. Abbreviations: HK = Housekeeper, OLS
= Ordinary least squares model, HM = Heckman selection correction model.
Source: SOEP (v31.1) and Federal Statistical Office, own calculations.
most: In 2009, their mean real income from in-kind benefits summed up to 5,781
Euro which is 38.6% of cash income. For children living with cohabiting and married
couple families the same share was only 21.9% and 22.0%, respectively. In 2013,
levels have increased to 6.003 Euro (44.0% of cash income) for children living with
single parents, 4.286 Euro (22.2% of cash income) for children living with cohabiting
parents, and 5.087 Euro (23.9% of cash income) for children living with married
parents.
The monetary value of parental childcare time tends to be the lowest for chil-
dren living with married couple parents. In 2009, the mean real equivalized transfer
added from parental childcare time was 11,022 Euro for children living with married
couple parents compared to an average of 11,986 Euro for children living with a
single parent when applying the housekeeper wage approach. Similar patterns are
observed on lower levels when using the opportunity cost approaches. At the same
time, overall trends are unambiguous: real disposable income from parental child-
care time has mostly decreased over time for all children but for children living with
cohabiting parents when using the opportunity cost approaches.25
In addition, disposable cash income differences between children living with
single parents and children living with married parents are notably reduced by the
extension of the income definition. In 2009, the cash income ratio between these
two groups amounted to 68.6%, whereas the extended income ratio was 86.9% when
using the housekeeper wage approach. If the OLS and Heckman approaches are
used, instead, the extended income ratios were 85.5% and 85.6%, respectively. In
2013, the cash income ratio decreased to 64.0%, while the extended income ratio
25This result might just be driven by the relatively low sample size of children living with
cohabiting parents which is 700 to 900 children per year.
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did almost not change and was 86.5% when using the housekeeper wage approach.
If the OLS and Heckman approaches are used, the extended income ratios slightly
decreased to 83.3% and 84.6%, respectively. All in all, the extended income ratios
are always higher than the initial cash income ratio such that the transfers added
from parental childcare time, and public childcare and education tend to equalize
the income distribution. At the same time, single parents were able to slightly lower
the gap in real disposable cash incomes, too. The distributional effects are discussed
in more detail in the next section.
Table 2: Mean real disposable incomes by component and family type, 2009-2013
(in Euro)
Family Cash In-kind Opport. cost appr. Total extended income
Year type income benefits HK OLS HM HK OLS HM
2009
Single 14,966 5,781 11,986 10,075 10,331 32,733 30,821 31,077
Cohabiting 19,817 4,343 12,916 8,555 8,822 37,076 32,715 32,982
Married 21,828 4,803 11,022 9,425 9,675 37,652 36,055 36,305
2010
Single 14,807 6,176 11,362 10,369 10,757 32,345 31,352 31,740
Cohabiting 19,969 5,009 12,620 10,416 10,910 37,598 35,394 35,888
Married 21,716 5,128 10,502 9,587 9,956 37,346 36,432 36,801
2011
Single 14,711 6,253 11,152 9,927 10,416 32,116 30,891 31,380
Cohabiting 19,505 5,459 9,824 8,288 8,679 34,788 33,253 33,644
Married 21,132 5,302 9,966 9,094 9,441 36,399 35,528 35,875
2012
Single 14,820 6,223 11,460 10,144 10,694 32,503 31,186 31,736
Cohabiting 20,184 5,073 11,133 9,218 9,789 36,390 34,476 35,047
Married 21,804 5,429 9,529 9,191 9,625 36,763 36,425 36,859
2013
Single 13,647 6,003 11,712 9,536 10,449 31,362 29,186 30,099
Cohabiting 19,331 4,286 11,720 10,200 10,917 35,337 33,817 34,534
Married 21,326 5,087 9,829 8,637 9,165 36,242 35,049 35,578
Note: All incomes and expenditures are measured in 2010 Euros. Disposable cash income is equivalized using the
modified OECD scale. Incomes from parental childcare time are equivalized using a modified square root scale.
In-kind benefits are not equivalized but measured on an individual basis. Abbreviations: HK = Housekeeper wage
approach, OLS = Ordinary least squares model, HM = Heckman selection correction model.
Source: SOEP (v31.1), and Federal Statistical Office, own calculations.
3.2 Distributional Effects
The results presented so far already suggest that the extension of the income defi-
nition is accompanied by large changes in the distribution of children’s disposable
resources. A first glimpse into the direction of the distributive effect of each extended
income component can be drawn from investigating the relationship between dis-
posable cash income and each component.
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Table 3 depicts the pairwise correlation coefficients between disposable cash
income and income from parental childcare as well as income from public childcare
and education. First of all, there is a very small and positive correlation between
cash income and income from in-kind benefits. This might be explained by two
factors: first, the amount of transfers from schooling only depends on the federal
state a child lives in at the time of the survey but not on the disposable cash income
of its parents. Splitting up in-kind benefits into benefits from schooling on the one
hand and benefits from publicly provided childcare on the other hand reveals that the
correlation coefficient between disposable cash income and transfers from schooling
is statistically insignificant different from zero at the 10% level across all years (not
displayed here). Second, the small positive correlation is mainly explained by the
transfers received from publicly provided childcare. This would be in line with the
findings of (Schober and Stahl, 2014) who show that the probability of using publicly
provided childcare is the highest among better educated, married women in East
and West Germany followed by single mothers. Therefore, it seems to be plausible
not to find a linear relationship between disposable cash income and transfers from
public in-kind benefits.
In contrast, the correlation between income from parental childcare based on
the housekeeper wage approach and cash income is unambiguously negative. There-
fore, it tends to equalize the income distribution due to a simple mechanism: the
housekeeper wage rate is flat and the same for all parents. Thus, it narrows the
income distribution. At the same time, cash income is positively correlated with
income from parental childcare time regarding both opportunity cost approaches.
Therefore, the opportunity cost approaches tend to reproduce existing cash income
inequalities, because it reproduces inequalities from existing differences in the pro-
ductivity of children’s parents that are highly correlated with their market cash
income and, accordingly, their disposable cash income.
Table 3: Correlations between disposable cash income and income from parental
childcare time, and public childcare and education
Year In-kind benefits Housekeeper OLS Heckman
2009 0.063 -0.166 0.176 0.161
2010 0.064 -0.167 0.173 0.157
2011 0.096 -0.150 0.223 0.200
2012 0.071 -0.195 0.190 0.165
2013 0.099 -0.153 0.257 0.215
Source: SOEP (v31.1), and Federal Statistical Office, own calculations.
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Since children from single parent families are more likely to be found in the
lower part of the initial disposable cash income distribution (not shown here; also see
OECD, 2011), a closer look at the different regions of the cash and extended income
distribution is also of great interest. Figure 2 provides insights into this question by
showing the relative change in mean disposable incomes by the initial cash income
quintiles for each year. In general, all children benefit from adding transfers from
parental childcare time, and public childcare and education, but the relative increase
in extended income is the largest for children from the lowest quintile.
In 2009, extended income of the first quintile was 187% larger than cash income
when using the housekeeper wage approach. Using the opportunity cost approaches
has smaller effect sizes: 127% (OLS) and 131% (Heckman). Although the effect
diminishes with higher quantiles, mean extended incomes are still 44% larger in the
fifth quintile than the respective cash incomes when using the housekeeper wage ap-
proach. The increase of mean incomes according to the opportunity cost approaches
is 49 to 50% for the fifth quintile, but differences are less severe in this quintile. In
2013, the effect size is slightly smaller such that extended income of the first quintile
is 171% larger than cash income when using the housekeeper wage approach. Using
the opportunity cost approaches results in an increase of 117% (OLS) and 126%
(Heckman). In the fifth quintile, mean extended incomes are still 43% larger than
the respective cash incomes when using the housekeeper wage approach. Again,
the increase of mean incomes is larger when using the opportunity cost approaches
(around 53 to 54%).
Figure 2: Relative change in mean real extended incomes across cash income quin-
tiles by year
Source: SOEP (v31.1), and Federal Statistical Office, own calculations.
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In addition to these findings, Table 4 depicts the weighted (cumulative) income
shares by cash income deciles for each income definition and for each year. In gen-
eral, extending the income definition increases the income shares of all deciles up to
the 7th percentile. The magnitude of the effects slightly varies with either using the
housekeeper wage approach or the opportunity cost approaches, but similar patterns
can be observed across all years. Furthermore, the redistributive impact of public
childcare and education is especially strong for the bottom 50% of the initial cash in-
come distribution (column ”CI+IKB”). This becomes apparent if, for example, the
differences in income shares between columns ”CI+IKB” and ”EI(HM)” are investi-
gated more closely: Most of the increases in income shares are already explained by
adding the value of public in-kind benefits (column ”CI+IKB”) to disposable cash
income. Adding transfers from parental childcare to cash income and income from
in-kind benefits even slightly decreases income shares (column ”EI(HM)”) such that
existing differences in cash income are reproduced. This is another hint that public
in-kind benefits are highly redistributive and benefit children from low and middle
income families the most. Finally, the estimated cumulative income shares already
imply that the extended income Lorenz curves will lie straight above the Lorenz
curve of initial cash income. Thus, extended incomes are very likely to be more
equally distributed than cash incomes and have a welfare increasing effect.
Figure 3 shows the impact of extending the income definition on the distribu-
tion of children’s disposable cash and extended incomes in Germany between 2009
and 2013. Major results are that extended income inequality is significantly lower
than disposable cash income inequality across all years and that the extension does
not change distributional trends significantly. Furthermore, extended income in-
equality is the lowest if the monetary value of childcare is measured in terms of the
housekeeper wage approach. This is as expected, since applying a flat wage rate to
differently productive individuals will automatically narrow the income distribution
by more than any approach allowing for heterogeneity. The redistributive impact
of public in-kind benefits is also noteworthy since inequality measured by the Gini
coefficient is already reduced by eleven to fourteen percent. Regarding the opportu-
nity cost approaches only, public in-kind benefits explain most of the reduction in
inequality while parental childcare plays a minor role in equalizing the initial cash
income distribution.
The Gini coefficient of disposable cash and extended income did not signifi-
cantly change at the 5% level over time. However, a decreasing trend can be observed
for cash incomes which would be in line with the increase of the cash income ratio
between children from single and married parents observed before. At the same
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Table 4: Income shares, 2009-2013 (weighted)
Income shares (in percent) Cumul. income shares (in percent)
Decile CI CI+IKB EI(HK) EI(OLS) EI(HM) CI CI+IKB EI(HK) EI(OLS) EI(HM)
2009
1 4.2 5.6 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.2 5.6 4.7 4.7 4.7
2 5.7 7.0 6.3 6.3 6.3 9.9 12.6 11.0 11.0 11.0
3 6.8 7.8 7.4 7.3 7.2 16.6 20.4 18.5 18.3 18.3
4 7.5 8.5 8.0 8.1 8.1 24.1 28.9 26.4 26.4 26.4
5 8.4 9.2 8.9 9.0 8.8 32.6 38.1 35.4 35.4 35.4
6 9.5 10.0 9.9 9.8 9.6 42.1 48.1 45.3 45.3 45.3
7 10.8 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 52.8 58.8 56.0 55.9 55.9
8 12.1 11.7 11.8 11.9 12.0 64.9 70.5 67.8 67.8 67.8
9 14.3 13.1 13.7 13.8 13.7 79.2 83.6 81.5 81.6 81.6
10 20.8 16.4 18.5 18.4 19.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2010
1 4.3 5.6 4.9 4.9 4.7 4.3 5.6 4.9 4.9 4.7
2 5.8 7.1 6.4 6.4 6.3 10.1 12.7 11.3 11.3 11.0
3 6.8 7.9 7.4 7.4 7.3 17.0 20.6 18.7 18.7 18.3
4 7.6 8.6 8.2 8.2 8.1 24.5 29.2 26.9 26.9 26.4
5 8.4 9.3 9.0 8.9 8.8 32.9 38.5 35.9 35.9 35.2
6 9.5 9.9 9.8 9.8 9.7 42.4 48.4 45.7 45.7 44.9
7 10.6 10.7 10.6 10.6 10.7 53.0 59.1 56.3 56.3 55.6
8 11.9 11.5 11.8 11.8 11.9 65.0 70.6 68.1 68.1 67.4
9 14.2 13.0 13.5 13.5 13.8 79.2 83.6 81.6 81.6 81.2
10 20.8 16.4 18.4 18.4 18.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2011
1 4.4 5.7 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.4 5.7 4.9 4.9 4.8
2 5.8 7.1 6.5 6.5 6.5 10.2 12.8 11.5 11.4 11.3
3 6.7 7.9 7.3 7.4 7.3 16.9 20.7 18.8 18.8 18.5
4 7.6 8.6 8.1 8.2 8.1 24.6 29.2 26.9 27.0 26.6
5 8.5 9.2 8.9 8.9 8.9 33.1 38.5 35.8 35.9 35.5
6 9.5 9.9 9.7 9.7 9.7 42.6 48.4 45.5 45.6 45.2
7 10.8 10.7 10.6 10.6 10.7 53.4 59.1 56.2 56.2 55.9
8 12.0 11.6 11.7 11.7 11.9 65.4 70.7 67.9 68.0 67.8
9 14.3 13.0 13.6 13.5 13.6 79.6 83.7 81.5 81.5 81.4
10 20.4 16.3 18.5 18.5 18.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2012
1 4.5 5.8 5.1 5.1 4.9 4.5 5.8 5.1 5.1 4.9
2 5.9 7.1 6.6 6.6 6.5 10.4 13.0 11.7 11.7 11.5
3 6.9 7.9 7.5 7.5 7.4 17.3 20.9 19.2 19.2 18.8
4 7.7 8.6 8.3 8.3 8.2 25.0 29.5 27.5 27.5 27.0
5 8.8 9.3 9.0 9.0 8.9 33.8 38.7 36.5 36.5 35.9
6 9.4 10.0 9.8 9.8 9.8 43.2 48.7 46.3 46.3 45.7
7 10.6 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 53.8 59.4 57.0 57.0 56.4
8 12.0 11.7 11.6 11.7 11.8 65.8 71.0 68.6 68.6 68.2
9 14.1 13.0 13.5 13.3 13.6 80.0 84.0 82.1 81.9 81.8
10 20.0 16.0 17.9 18.1 18.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2013
1 4.3 5.1 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.3 5.1 4.4 4.4 4.5
2 5.8 6.9 6.2 6.2 6.1 10.1 12.0 10.7 10.6 10.6
3 6.7 8.1 7.3 7.3 7.2 16.8 20.1 18.0 17.9 17.8
4 7.6 8.3 8.2 8.2 8.0 24.3 28.5 26.2 26.1 25.8
5 8.5 9.2 8.9 8.9 9.1 32.8 37.7 35.0 35.0 34.8
6 9.4 10.0 9.9 9.7 9.5 42.2 47.6 44.9 44.7 44.3
7 10.6 10.8 10.6 10.7 10.7 52.8 58.5 55.5 55.4 55.0
8 12.2 11.8 11.9 11.8 12.1 64.9 70.3 67.3 67.3 67.2
9 14.3 13.2 13.7 13.6 14.0 79.3 83.4 81.1 80.9 81.1
10 20.7 16.6 18.9 19.1 18.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Deciles are calculated from the initial disposable cash income distribution. Abbreviations: CI = Cash
income, IKB = In-kind benefits, EI = Extended income, HK = Housekeeper wage approach, OLS = Ordinary
least squares model, HM = Heckman selection correction model. Source: SOEP (v31.1), and Federal Statistical
Office, own calculations.
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time, extended income inequality did slightly increase by 4.4% (Housekeeper), 3.5%
(OLS), and 4.1% (Heckman) regarding the extended income approaches. However,
this is largely driven by the increase between 2012 and 2013.26 Before 2013, there
is also a declining trend of the Gini coefficient. Adding the value of public in-kind
benefits to disposable cash income yields similar results.
The inequality reducing effects of extending the income definition are even
more pronounced if measures are used that are more sensitive for changes at the
tails of the income distribution, namely the Mean Logarithmic Deviation (MLD)
coefficient and half the squared coefficient of variation (HSQCV). As depicted in
Panel b of Figure 3, extending the income definition reduces the Gini coefficient by
around 11% to 33% across all years and approaches, while the MLD coefficient is
decreased by 20% to 55%. The equalizing effect is the largest if HSQCV is considered
which is more sensitive to changes at the top: income inequality is decreased by
25% to 60%. Note that the differences between the OLS and the Heckman selection
correction model are, again, only marginal.
Furthermore, a decomposition of extended income inequality by income source
is performed to unravel the relative contribution of each component to overall in-
equality. Inequality is measured by half the squared coefficient of variation (HSQCV),
which can be exactly decomposed by income source, is mean independent, and can
handle zero values (see Shorrocks, 1982). Income definitions remain unchanged, i.e.
disposable cash income is equivalized using the modified OECD scale, disposable in-
come from parental childcare time is equivalized using a modified square root scale,
and disposable income from in-kind benefits is measured on an individual basis.
As depicted in Table 5, income components are differently distributed and
vary in their contribution to overall extended income inequality. Disposable cash
incomes are more equally distributed than incomes from parental and non-parental
childcare and education. At the same time, disposable cash income contributes to
total extended income inequality the most, while in-kind benefits the least. The
share of cash income varies between 54% and 71% depending on the respective year
and approach to evaluate parental childcare time; the share is larger if parental
childcare is evaluated by the housekeeper approach, which is due to lower average
wage rates given the same distribution of parental childcare hours.
An unexpected finding is the small, positive contribution of in-kind benefits to
26The income year 2013 is the first year that contains valid information on childcare time for
individuals from the IAB-SOEP Migration Sample. Thus, the increase between 2012 and 2013 is
very likely to be driven by the integration of this new sub-sample despite the use of individual
cross-sectional weighting factors provided by the SOEP.
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Figure 3: Trends in disposable cash and extended income inequality, 2009-2013
(a) Gini (b) Relative change of Gini coefficient
(c) MLD (d) Relative change of MLD coefficient
(e) HSQCV (f) Relative change of HSQCV
Note: Significance at the five percent level is calculated using bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications.
Abbreviations: HK = Housekeeper wage approach, OLS = Ordinary least squares model, HM = Heckman
selection correction model.
Source: SOEP (v31.1), and Federal Statistical Office, own calculations.
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overall inequality. It varies between two and six percent and shows a slight increas-
ing trend over time. Since inequality is remarkably lower in the joint distribution of
extended income, a negative contribution of in-kind benefits was actually expected.
This positive contribution is very likely to be explained by the small but positive
correlation between total extended income and income from in-kind benefits. Ac-
cordingly, children with command over higher disposable cash incomes also receive a
slightly higher amount of in-kind benefits. This is backed up by the finding that the
absolute mean value of received in-kind benefits generally rises with disposable cash
income quintiles. In 2009, for example, the first quintile received in-kind benefits of
4,655 Euro on average, while the fifth quintile got 5,164 Euro. However, the relative
income increase is larger for low income children. Similar patterns are observed
across all years.
Therefore, adding the monetary value of in-kind benefits to disposable cash
incomes increases the absolute distance between extended incomes but, at the same
time, decreases the relative distance of incomes to each other and to the mean. The
latter is the crucial determinant for the reduction of inequality in extended incomes.
Hence, although in-kind benefits are more unequally distributed than cash incomes
and show a positive proportional contribution to extended income inequality in
the decomposition framework, they reduce the relative distance between disposable
extended incomes and, thus, extended income inequality.27 The same argumentation
can be applied to the income generated from parental childcare time.
Moreover, a decomposition of HSQCV by family type reveals that cash and
extended income inequalities are mainly due to differences within family types (see
Table A.10 in the Appendix). In contrast, the effect of changing family patterns
seems to be negligible, although differences between family types have slightly in-
creased over time.
However, comparing inequality coefficients is not sufficient to make reliable
social welfare comparisons. Therefore, Figure 4 depicts generalized Lorenz curves
for each year to evaluate and rank the different income distributions on welfare
grounds. Since all three extended income distributions strictly lie above the cash
income distribution showing no points of intersection with the said, each of them is
clearly dominating the cash income distribution. Thus, they are welfare superior.
27Incomes from in-kind benefits and parental childcare time tend to be more unequally dis-
tributed than cash income since the share of valid zero observations is much higher. For instance,
a three year old child receives a value of zero Euro from in-kind benefits if only his parents take
care of him. At the same time, a three year old is not going to school and, thus, receives no income
from education. Comparing all three distributions for values larger than zero changes the picture





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Considering the cash distribution including the value of in-kind benefits only, already
leads to a higher welfare level compared to the initial cash income distribution.
Figure 4: Generalized Lorenz curves of disposable cash and extended income, 2009-
2013
Abbreviations: HK = Housekeeper wage approach, OLS = Ordinary least squares model, HM = Heckman
selection correction model.
Source: SOEP (v31.1), and Federal Statistical Office, own calculations.
3.3 Robustness Check
So far, the value of parental childcare time has been calculated using information
on parental childcare hours on an average weekday. In doing so, it has been shown
that single parents spend less hours on childcare than married or cohabiting couple
parents. However, it is conceivable that single parents can compensate the lack of
time during the week by spending more hours with their children at the weekend.
If this is the case, the equalizing effect of parental childcare time could be more
pronounced. Thus, hours of parental childcare on an average Saturday and Sunday
are considered in a robustness check to determine the value of parental childcare
time.
However, there are some limitations to this analysis that should be mentioned.
On the one hand, there is a severe difference in the decision problem parents face
during the week and at the weekend. The vast majority of parents do not have
to choose between paid market work and unpaid childcare at the weekend, and
public childcare and schooling are not provided as a substitute for parental care.
Hence, opportunity costs as well as the costs of professional childcare should differ
substantially between the weekend and the week. On the other hand, time use
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information on Saturdays and Sundays is only available biannually in the SOEP
core samples such that information is missing for the survey years 2010, 2012, and
2014 (income years 2009, 2011, and 2013). Nevertheless, by integrating the SOEP-
related FiD survey there is at least some information for 2012 (income year 2011).
However, information on the before mentioned years has to be largely imputed which
introduces uncertainty into the analysis.
Imputation is done in two consecutive steps: In a first step, missing values in
t, t ∈ {2010, 2012, 2014}, are logically imputed for parents with dependent children
aged 13 or below by using the average of t − 1 and t + 1 whenever information
on both neighbouring years is available. If information is only available for one of
the two years, the information from the year available is used if the condition of a
dependent child living in the household is fulfilled. In 2012, imputation is only done
for sub-samples A-K, i.e. excluding sub-samples from the FiD. For 2014, either
the average of t − 1 and t − 2 is used or just the information from t − 1 which
depends on the information available. A crucial assumption in doing this logical
imputation is that parents do not change their preferences on parental childcare
drastically from one year to the next. This assumption might be violated whenever
there are fundamental changes in life, for example unemployment, divorce, severe
illness, or other life changing events. Therefore, the results from this imputation
should be treated cautiously and more attention should be drawn on the years with
full information, namely 2011 and 2013 (income years 2010 and 2012).
In a second step, still missing information in t is imputed by means of a
predictive means matching. This is done for both sexes separately. Since this
imputation approach yields continuous estimates, these are then categorized into
19 distinct categories ranging from zero to eighteen. A transformation of this kind
is necessary to receive a distribution of parental childcare time that is comparable
to the original data which is categorical and only states full hours ranging from zero
to eighteen.28 Histograms on the distribution of observed and imputed parental
childcare time on an average Saturday and Sunday are presented in Figure A.3 in
the Appendix.
Doing identical analyses as before, but considering information on weekends
in determining the value of parental childcare time and assuming a year to have 365
working days, reveals that single parents cannot mitigate the existing differences in
childcare hours emerging during the week by additional care at the weekend. In fact,
existing differences are amplified which results in even larger disparities in resources
28See Table A.11 in the Appendix for the categorisation scheme.
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among children (see Table A.6 in the Appendix for a comparison of average childcare
hours on different days.)
Table 6 shows the trends in yearly mean real (equivalized) disposable incomes
by family type between 2009 and 2013.29 In general, the value of parental childcare
time almost doubles for children living with single parents and more than doubles for
children living with married couple parents across all three evaluation approaches
and all years. Accordingly, including parental childcare time at weekends raises
total extended incomes between 26% to 42%. At the same time, the level increase of
transfers relativises the importance of disposable cash income which translates into
an increase of the extended income ratios between children living with single parents
and children living with married couple parents compared to the main analysis. The
extended income ratio has slightly increased from 90.2% in 2009 to 91.1% in 2013
when using the housekeeper wage approach. This is 4.6 percentage points more in
2013 compared to not considering weekends. Using the opportunity cost approaches
yields similar results.
The distributional impact of incorporating childcare time done at weekends is
shown in Figure 5. The equalizing effect of parental childcare time is weaker now
and for some years it is not significantly different from the disposable cash distribu-
tion any more (at the 5% level): extending the income definition reduces the Gini
coefficient by around 6% to 7% across all years when using the opportunity cost
approaches; without considering weekends the inequality reducing effect was be-
tween 12% to 18%. Applying the MLD coefficient and HSQCV yields qualitatively
similar results, i.e. the inequality reducing effect is less pronounced. In conclusion,
considering parental childcare time done at weekends in the analysis leads to an am-
plification of existing differences in children’s resources and cushions the inequality
reducing effect of parental childcare as a whole. However, it again highlights the
inequality reducing effect of public childcare and education.
29Differences to Table 2 occur since the number of observations slightly differs.
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Table 6: Mean real disposable incomes by component and family type (including
weekends), 2009-2013 (in Euro)
Family Cash In-kind Opport. cost appr. Total extended income
Year type income benefits HK OLS HM HK OLS HM
2009
Single 14,989 5,782 23,427 19,451 19,844 44,198 40,222 40,615
Cohabiting 19,863 4,369 26,471 18,703 19,071 50,703 42,935 43,302
Married 21,799 4,804 22,400 19,643 20,001 49,003 46,247 46,605
2010
Single 14,818 6,168 22,824 20,398 21,040 43,810 41,383 42,025
Cohabiting 20,150 5,012 25,863 21,696 22,435 51,024 46,858 47,596
Married 21,799 5,138 20,536 19,111 19,642 47,474 46,048 46,579
2011
Single 14,609 6,254 23,054 19,609 20,478 43,917 40,472 41,340
Cohabiting 19,356 5,429 22,191 18,344 19,032 46,976 43,129 43,817
Married 21,201 5,258 20,485 19,123 19,672 46,945 45,582 46,131
2012
Single 14,846 6,180 22,406 19,353 20,257 43,432 40,380 41,284
Cohabiting 20,296 4,955 22,119 18,894 19,766 47,371 44,145 45,017
Married 21,961 5,433 19,546 18,991 19,621 46,940 46,385 47,015
2013
Single 13,584 5,994 25,018 21,140 22,783 44,597 40,718 42,362
Cohabiting 19,367 4,120 22,754 20,308 21,355 46,242 43,796 44,843
Married 21,211 5,052 22,686 19,942 20,762 48,949 46,205 47,025
Note: Hours of parental childcare on Saturdays and Sundays are fully imputed for income years 2009, 2011 and
2013, and partly imputed for 2012 by means of logical imputation and predictive mean matching using information
from income years 2008, 2010, and 2012. All incomes and expenditures are measured in 2010 Euros. Disposable
cash income is equivalized using the modified OECD scale. Incomes from parental childcare time are equivalized
using a modified square root scale. In-kind benefits are not equivalized but measured on an individual basis.
Abbreviations: HK = Housekeeper, OLS = Ordinary least squares model, HM = Heckman selection correction
model.
Source: SOEP (v31.1), and Federal Statistical Office, own calculations.
26
Figure 5: Trends in disposable cash and extended income inequality (including
weekends), 2009-2013
(a) Gini (b) Relative change of Gini coefficient
(c) MLD (d) Relative change of MLD coefficient
(e) HSQCV (f) Relative change of HSQCV
Note: Significance at the five percent level is calculated using bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications.
Hours of parental childcare on Saturdays and Sundays are fully imputed for income years 2009, 2011 and 2013,
and partly imputed for 2012 by means of logical imputation and predictive mean matching using information from
income years 2008, 2010, and 2012.
Abbreviations: HK = Housekeeper wage approach, OLS = Ordinary least squares model, HM = Heckman
selection correction model.
Source: SOEP (v31.1), and Federal Statistical Office, own calculations.
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4 Conclusion
This paper is the very first to assess the redistributive impact of both private and
public childcare provision and education on children’s economic resources in Ger-
many. Combining survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) with
administrative data from the German Federal Statistical Office covering the years
2009 to 2013, it is shown that extended income inequality is significantly lower than
disposable cash income inequality across all years and that the extension of the in-
come definition does not significantly change distributional trends. This finding is
robust to the use of different inequality measures, too.
Furthermore, the redistributive effect of parental childcare time is largely com-
parable with the more general findings of, for instance, Jenkins and O’Leary (1996)
for the UK, Zick et al. (2008) for the US, or Frick et al. (2012) for Germany. The
latter investigate the distributional impact of adding the value of overall home pro-
duction to disposable cash income for Germany in 2009. They find similar changes of
income and inequality levels which are especially pronounced for households from the
lower part of the initial cash income distribution. These findings are also robust to
the use of different evaluation approaches of parental childcare time. However, level
effects vary largely depending on the evaluation approach; using the housekeeper
approach yields the largest levelling effect since a uniform wage rate is adopted to
all caring parents neglecting any differences in their skill or productivity levels.
Despite this, the results also highlight the redistributive power of publicly pro-
vided childcare and schooling which reduces relative income differentials and cush-
ions existing inequalities in disposable cash income. Paulus et al. (2010); Garfinkel
et al. (2006) and Frick et al. (2011), among others, find similar patterns on the dis-
tributional effect of adding the value of public education to disposable cash income
for Germany and other European countries, but their analyses are limited to single
years and they do not put special emphasis on the available resources of children.
This study also shows that differences in family structures are a notable issue:
children living together with a single parent are disadvantaged in terms of disposable
cash income and parental childcare, but profit from public childcare and education
the most. How much a child actually gains from public childcare and education -
but also from parental childcare - depends on its position in the initial cash income
distribution. Children from the lowest quintiles gain by far more than children
from higher quintiles, at least in relative terms. And as cross-country analyses by
the (OECD, 2013), among others, show it is children from single parent families
who are more likely to be found in the lower parts of the cash income distribution.
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However, decomposing observed cash and extended income inequalities by family
type also shows that differences within family types are by far more pronounced
than differences between family types.
All in all, these findings provide further evidence on the hypothesis that the
provision of child-related public in-kind benefits, such as public childcare and educa-
tion, is a key policy instrument to mitigate the economic disadvantages experienced
by children from low socio-economic background. Their equalising potential sug-
gests that investing into the quality of public childcare may further foster equal
opportunities. However, these results cannot be used to draw the conclusion that
overall inequalities among children in Germany are not severe at all, since the re-
distributive effects of other public goods and services, like public health care, or
indirect taxes, like value added taxes, have not been considered in this study. Their
effect on the distribution of economic resources is not clear a priori and they might
change the picture into the other direction. Nevertheless, the results support the
allegation that disposable cash income alone is an incomplete measure of children’s
well-being and a limited indicator of a child’s access to economic resources shaping
opportunities in life.
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A Appendix A
Table A.1 depicts the evolution of mean yearly real public expenditures per child
on childcare including spending on cribs, kindergarten, after school care clubs and
publicly subsidized child minders. In 2009, Berlin spent most with an average of
7,367 Euro per child followed by Hamburg with 7,189 Euro. In contrast, Mecklen-
burg Western Pomerania and Saxony Anhalt spent least. Their mean expenditures
amounted to 3,416 Euro and 3,950 Euro per child, respectively. In 2013, Berlin was
still in the leading position spending an average of 8,802 Euro per child followed by
Northrhine-Westphalia (7,659 Euro) and Bremen (7,611 Euro). Mecklenburg West-
ern Pomerania (3,701 Euro), Saxony Anhalt (3,872 Euro), and Saxony (4,031 Euro)
spent least on childcare per child in 2013. However, almost all German federal states
increased their real per capita spending on childcare over the past years except of
Saxony, Saxony Anhalt, and Hamburg. The latter might be the consequence of less
demand of childcare provision due to a decreasing number of children in these fed-
eral states. At the same time, West German states increased their real per capita
expenditures by more than the East German states. The former spent on average
5,587 Euro in 2009 per child on childcare and increased their spending to 6,715 Euro
in 2013 (+20%), while the latter increased their mean real expenditures from 4,718
Euro in 2009 to 5,187 Euro in 2013 (+10%).
Table A.2 shows the trend in average yearly real public expenditures per child
on schooling between 2009 and 2013. In 2009, the highest per capita spending on
schooling is observed in Thuringia and Saxony Anhalt: on average they spent 8,190
Euro and 7,685 Euro per child, respectively. In contrast, Northrhine-Westphalia
and Schleswig Holstein spent least with 5,460 Euro and 5,561 Euro, respectively. In
2013, Hamburg, Thuringia and Berlin spent the most: mean per capita spending on
schooling amounted to 8,420 Euro in Hamburg and 8,042 Euro both in Thuringia
and Berlin. The lowest mean spending is observed in Northrhine-Westphalia with
5,866 Euro and Schleswig-Holstein with 5,960 Euro. Again, almost all federal states
managed to raise their real per capita expenditures on schooling over the past years
but Saxony and Thuringia. However, these two countries operate on high levels
and still spend more than other federal states. At the same time, all East German
federal states together spent more on schooling on average than the West German
states. Nevertheless, the latter were able to increase their mean real spending by
around eight percent, which is six percentage points more compared to Eastern
states. Therefore, a convergence in spending can be observed.
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Table A.1: Mean real public expenditures per child on childcare services by region
(in Euro)
Region 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 4,703 5,406 5,342 6,354 6,823
Bavaria 4,759 5,152 5,411 5,452 5,958
Berlin 7,367 7,944 8,342 8,594 8,802
Brandenburg 4,234 4,343 4,567 4,480 4,490
Bremen 6,265 6,638 6,718 7,257 7,611
Hamburg 7,189 6,991 6,713 7,062 6,969
Hesse 5,666 6,198 6,293 6,360 6,506
Mecklenburg Western Pomerania 3,416 3,486 3,614 3,837 3,701
Lower Saxony 4,880 5,156 5,404 5,471 5,700
Northrhine-Westphalia 5,835 6,546 7,016 7,885 7,659
Rhineland Palatinate 6,082 6,733 6,970 6,990 7,049
Saarland 5,564 7,137 6,622 6,981 7,147
Saxony 4,334 4,359 4,041 3,995 4,031
Saxony Anhalt 3,950 4,053 3,842 3,783 3,872
Schleswig-Holstein 4,926 5,840 5,357 5,392 5,729
Thuringia 5,007 5,600 5,960 5,833 6,227
Note: All expenditures are in 2010 Euro.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2014a), own calculations.
Table A.2: Mean real public expenditures per child on schooling by region (in Euro)
Region 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 6,370 6,500 6,562 6,436 6,528
Bavaria 6,673 7,100 7,150 7,301 7,663
Berlin 7,381 7,800 8,031 7,877 8,042
Brandenburg 6,269 6,900 6,954 6,724 6,623
Bremen 6,471 7,200 7,248 7,109 7,001
Hamburg 7,583 7,900 8,129 8,165 8,420
Hesse 6,471 7,000 7,052 6,820 6,906
Mecklenburg Western Pomerania 6,370 6,900 6,758 6,532 6,717
Lower Saxony 5,966 6,300 6,268 6,244 6,528
Northrhine-Westphalia 5,460 5,600 5,681 5,764 5,866
Rhineland Palatinate 5,865 6,200 6,366 6,340 6,339
Saarland 5,966 6,400 6,268 6,436 6,149
Saxony 7,078 7,900 7,444 6,916 6,717
Saxony Anhalt 7,685 8,400 8,325 7,877 7,758
Schleswig-Holstein 5,561 5,900 5,779 5,860 5,960
Thuringia 8,190 8,800 8,521 8,165 8,042
Note: Expenditures on employees and administrational staff including social contributions for civil servants, aid
expenditure (Beihilfeaufwendungen), current operating expenses and capital expenditures. All expenditures are in
2010 Euro.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2015).
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Figure A.1: Distribution of parental childcare time on an average weekday by sex
Figure A.2: Distribution of parental childcare time within couples on an average
weekday by sex (excluding single parents)
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Table A.3: Number of children (aged 0-13) by family type (unweighted)
Year Single parents Cohabiting parents Married parents Total
2009 1,285 939 6,626 8,850
2010 1,598 840 7,075 9,513
2011 1,448 852 6,535 8,835
2012 1,219 763 5,707 7,689
2013 969 730 5,969 7,668
Total 6,519 4,124 31,912 42,555
Source: SOEP (v31.1), own calculations.
Table A.4: Relative number of children (aged 0-13) by family type (weighted)
Year Single parents Cohabiting parents Married parents Total
2009 12.2 9.2 78.6 100
2010 12.9 9 78.1 100
2011 12 10.4 77.6 100
2012 13.1 10.9 75.9 100
2013 12.4 10.5 77.1 100
Total 12.5 10 77.5 100
Source: SOEP (v31.1), own calculations.
Table A.5: Average hours of parental childcare time, and public childcare and edu-
cation on an average weekday by family type (weighted)
Total parental time Parental time per child Public childcare & education
Year Family Type Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
2009
Single 5.8 4.5 0 18 3.7 3.3 0 18 5.3 2.3 0 14.6
Cohabiting 9 6.4 0 36 6.1 5.3 0 36 4.5 3.2 0 13.1
Married 8.5 5.5 0 36 4.5 3.7 0 36 4.6 2.5 0 13.7
Total 8.2 5.5 0 36 4.6 3.9 0 36 4.6 2.6 0 14.6
2010
Single 5.8 4.2 0 18 3.9 3.5 0 18 5.5 2.3 0 13.7
Cohabiting 9.2 6.5 0 36 6.4 5.4 0 36 4.8 3.1 0 11.5
Married 8.6 5.6 0 36 4.5 3.7 0 36 4.6 2.5 0 13.1
Total 8.3 5.6 0 36 4.6 3.9 0 36 4.7 2.5 0 13.7
2011
Single 5.8 4.2 0 18 3.8 3.2 0 18 5.7 2.3 0 13.7
Cohabiting 7.5 5.3 0 31 4.9 4 0 31 5.1 3 0 14.2
Married 8.3 5.4 0 36 4.3 3.5 0 34 4.7 2.4 0 12.9
Total 7.9 5.4 0 36 4.3 3.5 0 34 4.9 2.5 0 14.2
2012
Single 6.1 4.7 0 18 4 3.5 0 18 5.6 2.3 0 13.7
Cohabiting 8.5 6.2 0 36 5.6 4.6 0 32 4.9 3.1 0 12.6
Married 8 5.4 0 36 4.2 3.5 0 36 4.7 2.4 0 12.7
Total 7.8 5.4 0 36 4.3 3.7 0 36 4.9 2.5 0 13.7
2013
Single 5.8 4.4 0 18 3.7 3.4 0 18 5.2 2.7 0 13.6
Cohabiting 8.3 5.3 0 36 5.4 4.2 0 24 4 3.3 0 12.5
Married 7.5 5.2 0 36 4 3.5 0 30 4.4 2.7 0 13.7
Total 7.4 5.2 0 36 4.1 3.6 0 30 4.4 2.8 0 13.7
Source: Own calculations, SOEP (v31.1).
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Table A.6: Average hours of parental childcare time on weekdays and weekends (weighted)
Weekday Saturday Sunday Week average
Year Family type Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
2009
Single 5.9 4.6 0 18 8.9 5.3 0 18 9.3 5.2 0 18 8 4.4 0 18
Cohabiting 9 6.4 0 36 15.7 6.5 0 36 17.1 7 0 36 12.8 5.9 0 36
Married 8.5 5.6 0 36 14.1 6.9 0 36 15.2 7 0 36 11.9 6 0 36
Total 8.2 5.6 0 36 13.6 6.9 0 36 14.6 7.1 0 36 11.5 5.9 0 36
2010
Single 5.9 4.2 0 18 9.2 5.2 0 18 9.5 5.1 0 18 8.2 4.5 0 18
Cohabiting 9.5 6.7 0 36 14.6 7.6 0 36 15.4 7.8 0 36 13.2 6.7 0 36
Married 8.7 5.7 0 36 13 7.5 0 36 13.9 7.7 0 36 11.8 6.5 0 36
Total 8.4 5.7 0 36 12.7 7.4 0 36 13.5 7.6 0 36 11.5 6.5 0 36
2011
Single 5.8 4.2 0 18 9.2 5.3 0 18 9.6 5.2 0 18 8.2 4.5 0 18
Cohabiting 9.5 5.7 0 36 14.9 7.4 0 36 15.7 7.4 0 36 13.4 6.4 0 36
Married 9.3 5.3 0 36 14.7 7.2 0 36 15.5 7.4 0 36 13.2 6.1 0 36
Total 8.7 5.3 0 36 13.7 7.2 0 36 14.4 7.4 0 36 12.2 6.2 0 36
2012
Single 6.2 4.8 0 18 9.3 5.4 0 18 9.6 5.4 0 18 8.3 4.8 0 18
Cohabiting 8.7 6.3 0 36 13.3 7.9 0 36 13.7 8.2 0 36 11.9 6.9 0 36
Married 8 5.5 0 36 12.8 7.6 0 36 13.5 7.8 0 36 11.4 6.6 0 36
Total 7.9 5.6 0 36 12.4 7.5 0 36 13 7.7 0 36 11.1 6.5 0 36
2013
Single 5.8 4.4 0 18 10.5 5.1 0 18 10.7 5 0 18 9 4.1 0 18
Cohabiting 8.5 5.5 0 36 15.4 6.4 0 36 15.5 6.5 0 36 11.8 5.2 0.3 29.7
Married 7.6 5.4 0 36 14.5 6.6 0 36 15.6 6.8 0 36 11.7 5.6 0 36
Total 7.5 5.4 0 36 14.1 6.6 0 36 14.9 6.7 0 36 11.4 5.5 0 36
Note: Hours of parental childcare on Saturdays and Sundays are fully imputed for income years 2009, 2011 and 2013, and partly imputed for 2012 by means of logical imputation and
predictive mean matching using information from income years 2008, 2010, and 2012.
Source: SOEP (v31.1), own calculations.
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Table A.7: Imputed average gross wage rates (weighted)
Year Observed Housekeeper OLS Heckman
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
2009 14.28 8.06 9.48 0.00 12.74 7.25 13.87 7.57
2010 14.32 7.97 9.00 0.00 12.85 7.20 13.78 7.37
2011 14.56 8.01 9.01 0.00 13.30 7.18 14.51 7.59
2012 14.84 8.38 9.19 0.00 13.41 7.59 14.67 7.93
2013 15.28 8.50 10.15 0.00 13.87 7.74 15.73 9.06
Note: Observed gross wage rates are just weighted sample means of the working age population.
Source: SOEP (v31.1), own calculations.
Table A.8: Imputed average gross wage rates by sex (weighted)
Men
Year Observed Housekeeper OLS Heckman
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
2009 15.71 8.63 9.48 0.00 14.19 7.86 16.05 8.17
2010 15.75 8.56 9.00 0.00 14.53 7.72 15.84 7.92
2011 15.96 8.58 9.01 0.00 14.86 7.74 16.74 8.23
2012 16.34 8.98 9.19 0.00 15.09 8.11 16.97 8.47
2013 16.77 9.04 10.15 0.00 15.56 8.21 18.43 10.24
Women
Year Observed Housekeeper OLS Heckman
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
2009 12.78 7.10 9.48 0.00 11.34 6.32 11.77 6.27
2010 12.78 6.97 9.00 0.00 11.24 6.25 11.81 6.20
2011 13.07 7.05 9.01 0.00 11.80 6.23 12.37 6.21
2012 13.27 7.38 9.19 0.00 11.80 6.66 12.48 6.68
2013 13.73 7.59 10.15 0.00 12.26 6.88 13.20 6.91
Note: Observed gross wage rates are just weighted sample means of the working age population.
Source: SOEP (v31.1), own calculations.
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Table A.9: Imputed average gross wage rates by family type (weighted)
Singles
Year Observed Housekeeper OLS Heckman
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
2009 11.32 6.77 9.48 0.00 10.99 6.26 11.53 6.48
2010 11.75 7.29 9.00 0.00 11.27 6.72 11.68 6.75
2011 11.56 7.01 9.01 0.00 11.17 6.49 11.76 6.66
2012 11.76 7.19 9.19 0.00 11.36 6.65 12.00 6.85
2013 12.14 7.63 10.15 0.00 11.79 7.10 12.53 7.57
Cohabiting
Year Observed Housekeeper OLS Heckman
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
2009 12.83 7.77 9.48 0.00 12.55 7.46 12.87 7.56
2010 13.22 7.75 9.00 0.00 12.89 7.30 13.28 7.36
2011 13.40 7.73 9.01 0.00 13.11 7.37 13.50 7.45
2012 13.91 8.28 9.19 0.00 13.66 7.78 14.23 7.95
2013 14.90 8.23 10.15 0.00 14.67 7.72 15.26 8.01
Married
Year Observed Housekeeper OLS Heckman
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
2009 14.10 8.41 9.48 0.00 13.70 7.87 14.23 8.07
2010 14.24 8.31 9.00 0.00 13.82 7.82 14.26 7.91
2011 14.60 8.50 9.01 0.00 14.20 7.99 14.73 8.17
2012 14.97 8.70 9.19 0.00 14.59 8.27 15.16 8.45
2013 15.53 8.98 10.15 0.00 15.20 8.56 15.95 9.06
Note: Observed gross wage rates are just weighted sample means of the working age population.
Source: SOEP (v31.1), own calculations.
40
To gain further insights into the reasons for rising extended income inequal-
ity, half the squared coefficient of variation (HSQCV) is decomposed by family
type. The decomposition of HSQCV is comprehensively explained in Mookherjee








2− 1], where k is the number of subgroups, vk = nk/n is the proportion
of the population in subgroup k, and λk = µk/mu is the mean income of subgroup
k in relation to the overall population mean.
The results of the decomposition by family types are depicted in Table A.10.
While disposable cash income has slightly decreased between 2009 and 2013, all
extended incomes have decreased over time. However, all income approaches have
in common that inequality is largely explained by differences within family types.
Extending the income definition even fortifies the explanatory power of within dif-
ferences in relative terms and, hence, lowers income inequalities between children
from different family types. It is especially noteworthy that between family type
inequality has increased across all income approaches such that the change of family
structures tends to have a distributional impact on children’s economic resources.
However, the changes are not statistically significant
Furthermore, extending the income definition also reduces inequalities for each
family type; the effect is the largest when the housekeeper wage approach is used to
quantify the monetary value of parental childcare time. All in all, adding the value
of public childcare and education as well as the monetary value of parental childcare
time to the disposable cash income of children in Germany reduces both the level
of inequality between and within different family types.
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Table A.10: Decomposition of HSQCV by family type
Cash Income
Year HSQCV HSQCV Within HSQCV Between HSQCV: Singles HSQCV: Cohab. HSQCV: Married
2009 0.1201 0.1142 0.0059 0.1244 0.1441 0.1091
2010 0.1232 0.1170 0.0062 0.0896 0.1048 0.1186
2011 0.1120 0.1067 0.0053 0.1099 0.0996 0.1060
2012 0.1036 0.0972 0.0064 0.1093 0.0938 0.0951
2013 0.1151 0.1073 0.0078 0.0966 0.1070 0.1061
Extended Income (Housekeeper Wage Approach)
Year HSQCV HSQCV Within HSQCV Between HSQCV: Singles HSQCV: Cohab. HSQCV: Married
2009 0.0496 0.0486 0.0009 0.0574 0.0553 0.0467
2010 0.0494 0.0483 0.0011 0.0436 0.0424 0.0495
2011 0.0473 0.0465 0.0008 0.0485 0.0432 0.0466
2012 0.0436 0.0428 0.0008 0.0500 0.0383 0.0424
2013 0.0521 0.0511 0.0010 0.0565 0.0442 0.0512
Extended Income (Opportunity Cost Approach - OLS)
Year HSQCV HSQCV Within HSQCV Between HSQCV: Singles HSQCV: Cohab. HSQCV: Married
2009 0.0785 0.0771 0.0014 0.0737 0.1006 0.0749
2010 0.0760 0.0748 0.0011 0.0627 0.0650 0.0772
2011 0.0767 0.0757 0.0010 0.0723 0.0724 0.0763
2012 0.0690 0.0678 0.0013 0.0698 0.0590 0.0684
2013 0.0860 0.0844 0.0016 0.0735 0.0750 0.0865
Extended Income (Opportunity Cost Approach - Heckman)
Year HSQCV HSQCV Within HSQCV Between HSQCV: Singles HSQCV: Cohab. HSQCV: Married
2009 0.0784 0.0770 0.0014 0.0747 0.1000 0.0748
2010 0.0757 0.0746 0.0011 0.0634 0.0646 0.0768
2011 0.0760 0.0750 0.0010 0.0716 0.0712 0.0757
2012 0.0687 0.0675 0.0012 0.0701 0.0590 0.0680
2013 0.0868 0.0855 0.0013 0.0808 0.0756 0.0870
Note: Stata module INEQDEC0 was used for decomposition (Jenkins, 1999).
Source: SOEP (v31.1), and Federal Statistical Office, own calculations.
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Table A.11: Conversion scheme of parental childcare hours, h
h =

0 if 0 ≤ h < 0.5
1 if 0.5 ≤ h < 1.5
2 if 1.5 ≤ h < 2.5
3 if 2.5 ≤ h < 3.5
4 if 3.5 ≤ h < 4.5
5 if 4.5 ≤ h < 5.5
6 if 5.5 ≤ h < 6.5
7 if 6.5 ≤ h < 7.5
8 if 7.5 ≤ h < 8.5
9 if 8.5 ≤ h < 9.5
10 if 9.5 ≤ h < 10.5
11 if 10.5 ≤ h < 11.5
12 if 11.5 ≤ h < 12.5
13 if 12.5 ≤ h < 13.5
14 if 13.5 ≤ h < 14.5
15 if 14.5 ≤ h < 15.5
16 if 15.5 ≤ h < 16.5
17 if 16.5 ≤ h < 17.5
18 if h ≥ 17.5
Figure A.3: Distribution of parental childcare time on an average Saturday and
Sunday
(a) Saturday (b) Sunday
Note: Hours of parental childcare on Saturdays and Sundays are fully imputed for income years 2009, 2011 and
2013, and partly imputed for 2012 by means of logical imputation and predictive mean matching using information
from income years 2008, 2010, and 2012.
Source: SOEP (v31.1), own calculations.
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B Supplemental Material for Online Appendix
B.1 Wage Regression Outputs
Table B.12: OLS regression of logged gross hourly wages (2009)
Male Female
Coeff. t p-value Coeff. t p-value
Age 0.011 1.0 0.315 0.019 2.5 0.014
Age Squared -0.000 -2.8 0.006 -0.000 -3.9 0.000
Part-Time Working Experience -0.040 -4.2 0.000 0.005 1.4 0.173
Part-Time Working Experience Squared 0.003 4.0 0.000 0.001 3.8 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience 0.042 8.2 0.000 0.039 12.5 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience Squared -0.000 -3.5 0.000 -0.000 -5.1 0.000
Schooling (Ref.: Lower Secondary)
Intermediate 0.134 7.5 0.000 0.136 6.3 0.000
College 0.311 12.1 0.000 0.303 11.8 0.000
Vocational Education (Ref.: None)
Basic Vocational 0.092 3.1 0.002 0.080 2.5 0.012
Higher Vocational 0.195 6.1 0.000 0.154 4.5 0.000
Tertiary 0.493 13.6 0.000 0.397 10.7 0.000
Marital Status (Ref.: Married)
Single -0.090 -4.3 0.000 -0.006 -0.3 0.789
Divorced -0.130 -4.1 0.000 -0.000 -0.0 0.984
Widowed -0.073 -0.7 0.466 -0.004 -0.1 0.949
No. of Children < 6 in HH (Ref.: None)
One Child < 6 -0.047 -2.5 0.011 0.016 0.6 0.528
Two or More Children < 6 -0.003 -0.1 0.896 0.076 2.0 0.051
Self-Rated Health (Ref.: Very Good)
Good -0.024 -1.1 0.271 -0.053 -2.4 0.019
Satisfactory -0.053 -2.2 0.025 -0.081 -3.3 0.001
Bad -0.106 -3.3 0.001 -0.116 -3.8 0.000
Very Bad -0.303 -3.8 0.000 -0.029 -0.4 0.707
Migration (Ref.: No)
1st Generation Immigrant -0.011 -0.3 0.736 -0.038 -0.9 0.395
2nd Generation Immigrant -0.001 -0.1 0.959 -0.003 -0.1 0.898
Location in 1989 (Ref.: GDR)
FRG 0.174 5.6 0.000 0.098 3.5 0.000
Abroad 0.068 1.0 0.320 0.039 0.5 0.614
Constant 1.904 9.4 0.000 1.607 9.7 0.000
Federal State Yes Yes
Adj. R-Square 0.356 0.244
Number of Observations 4837 4555
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: SOEP (v31.1), own calculations.
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Table B.13: Heckman regression of logged gross hourly wages (2009)
Male Female
Coeff. t p-value Coeff. t p-value
Wage Regression
Age 0.020 2.0 0.040 0.014 2.0 0.047
Age Squared -0.000 -3.2 0.001 -0.000 -3.7 0.000
Part-Time Working Experience -0.040 -5.2 0.000 0.008 1.9 0.058
Part-Time Working Experience Squared 0.003 5.2 0.000 0.000 3.2 0.002
Full-Time Working Experience 0.033 6.4 0.000 0.042 12.6 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience Squared -0.000 -3.7 0.000 -0.000 -6.0 0.000
Schooling (Ref.: Lower Secondary)
Intermediate 0.115 6.0 0.000 0.145 6.8 0.000
College 0.263 9.3 0.000 0.332 12.7 0.000
Vocational Education (Ref.: None)
Basic Vocational 0.075 2.5 0.013 0.070 2.5 0.014
Higher Vocational 0.163 4.7 0.000 0.147 4.7 0.000
Tertiary 0.457 12.6 0.000 0.380 11.0 0.000
Location in 1989 (Ref.: GDR)
FRG 0.180 5.9 0.000 0.111 3.9 0.000
Abroad 0.138 2.1 0.032 0.031 0.4 0.673
Migration (Ref.: No)
1st Generation Immigrant 0.009 0.2 0.811 -0.044 -1.1 0.278
2nd Generation Immigrant -0.006 -0.3 0.802 0.005 0.2 0.841
Constant 1.725 9.4 0.000 1.663 11.2 0.000
Selection Regression
Age 0.024 0.8 0.426 -0.003 -0.2 0.880
Age Squared -0.001 -4.0 0.000 -0.001 -4.0 0.000
Part-Time Working Experience 0.052 1.8 0.071 0.210 21.0 0.000
Part-Time Working Experience Squared 0.002 0.8 0.399 -0.004 -8.6 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience 0.105 7.7 0.000 0.114 13.6 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience Squared 0.000 0.2 0.831 -0.000 -0.6 0.569
Schooling (Ref.: Lower Secondary)
Intermediate 0.163 2.4 0.015 0.274 4.7 0.000
College 0.655 7.0 0.000 0.476 6.5 0.000
Vocational Education (Ref.: None)
Basic Vocational 0.281 3.1 0.002 0.224 3.1 0.002
Higher Vocational 0.532 4.8 0.000 0.292 3.5 0.000
Tertiary 0.563 4.8 0.000 0.523 5.4 0.000
Location in 1989 (Ref.: GDR)
FRG -0.139 -1.2 0.221 -0.226 -2.5 0.011
Abroad -0.267 -1.3 0.195 -0.359 -2.0 0.050
Migration (Ref.: No)
1st Generation Immigrant -0.081 -0.7 0.515 0.085 0.8 0.428
2nd Generation Immigrant 0.180 1.9 0.056 0.042 0.6 0.573
Marital Status (Ref.: Married)
Single 0.078 1.0 0.335 0.293 4.0 0.000
Divorced -0.132 -1.3 0.192 0.037 0.6 0.576
Widowed -0.012 -0.0 0.977 0.062 0.3 0.736
No. of Children < 6 in HH (Ref.: None)
One Child < 6 -0.442 -6.1 0.000 -1.066 -18.0 0.000
Two or More Children < 6 -0.668 -7.6 0.000 -1.573 -19.7 0.000
Self-Rated Health (Ref.: Very Good)
Good 0.220 2.8 0.005 0.012 0.2 0.862
Satisfactory 0.227 2.6 0.009 -0.001 -0.0 0.989
Bad -0.146 -1.4 0.165 -0.108 -1.2 0.222
Very Bad -0.684 -4.2 0.000 -0.777 -4.7 0.000
Constant 0.799 1.3 0.182 0.780 1.7 0.083
Mills
Lambda -0.269 -3.8 0.000 0.045 1.3 0.180
Federal State Yes Yes
Number of Observations 5128 5973
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: SOEP (v31.1), own calculations.
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Table B.14: OLS regression of logged gross hourly wages (2010)
Male Female
Coeff. t p-value Coeff. t p-value
Age 0.018 1.9 0.053 0.018 2.8 0.005
Age Squared -0.000 -3.0 0.002 -0.000 -4.6 0.000
Part-Time Working Experience -0.034 -5.1 0.000 0.008 2.8 0.004
Part-Time Working Experience Squared 0.002 4.5 0.000 0.000 3.7 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience 0.032 7.7 0.000 0.033 12.8 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience Squared -0.000 -2.9 0.004 -0.000 -3.7 0.000
Schooling (Ref.: Lower Secondary)
Intermediate 0.146 9.6 0.000 0.158 8.6 0.000
College 0.320 14.9 0.000 0.333 15.1 0.000
Vocational Education (Ref.: None)
Basic Vocational 0.090 3.5 0.000 0.099 3.7 0.000
Higher Vocational 0.172 6.2 0.000 0.184 6.3 0.000
Tertiary 0.459 14.6 0.000 0.437 13.9 0.000
Marital Status (Ref.: Married)
Single -0.050 -2.9 0.004 0.012 0.6 0.529
Divorced -0.093 -3.6 0.000 0.046 2.7 0.008
Widowed -0.076 -0.8 0.452 -0.022 -0.5 0.648
No. of Children < 6 in HH (Ref.: None)
One Child < 6 0.010 0.6 0.517 0.029 1.5 0.128
Two or More Children < 6 0.037 1.7 0.085 0.031 0.8 0.438
Self-Rated Health (Ref.: Very Good)
Good -0.020 -1.1 0.274 -0.037 -1.8 0.074
Satisfactory -0.065 -3.3 0.001 -0.066 -3.0 0.003
Bad -0.119 -4.5 0.000 -0.072 -2.6 0.009
Very Bad -0.188 -2.7 0.007 -0.126 -2.3 0.021
Migration (Ref.: No)
1st Generation Immigrant 0.004 0.1 0.883 0.044 1.3 0.200
2nd Generation Immigrant 0.013 0.7 0.503 0.010 0.5 0.620
Location in 1989 (Ref.: GDR)
FRG 0.134 5.3 0.000 0.084 3.8 0.000
Abroad 0.059 1.1 0.273 -0.009 -0.2 0.873
Constant 1.735 9.8 0.000 1.607 11.7 0.000
Federal State Yes Yes
Adj. R-Square 0.375 0.257
Number of Observations 5560 5767
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: SOEP (v31.1), own calculations.
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Table B.15: Heckman regression of logged gross hourly wages (2010)
Male Female
Coeff. t p-value Coeff. t p-value
Wage Regression
Age 0.035 3.9 0.000 0.013 2.0 0.046
Age Squared -0.001 -5.1 0.000 -0.000 -3.9 0.000
Part-Time Working Experience -0.040 -6.1 0.000 0.008 2.1 0.034
Part-Time Working Experience Squared 0.002 5.3 0.000 0.000 3.1 0.002
Full-Time Working Experience 0.021 4.2 0.000 0.034 11.3 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience Squared -0.000 -1.6 0.109 -0.000 -4.0 0.000
Schooling (Ref.: Lower Secondary)
Intermediate 0.130 7.6 0.000 0.162 8.6 0.000
College 0.307 13.0 0.000 0.341 14.6 0.000
Vocational Education (Ref.: None)
Basic Vocational 0.077 3.0 0.002 0.101 4.0 0.000
Higher Vocational 0.154 5.3 0.000 0.195 7.0 0.000
Tertiary 0.428 13.5 0.000 0.437 14.3 0.000
Location in 1989 (Ref.: GDR)
FRG 0.129 5.1 0.000 0.107 4.4 0.000
Abroad 0.123 2.2 0.026 -0.002 -0.0 0.971
Migration (Ref.: No)
1st Generation Immigrant 0.008 0.2 0.812 0.026 0.7 0.490
2nd Generation Immigrant 0.002 0.1 0.933 0.014 0.6 0.530
Constant 1.494 9.0 0.000 1.691 12.4 0.000
Selection Regression
Age -0.096 -3.2 0.001 -0.048 -2.5 0.013
Age Squared 0.000 0.2 0.858 -0.000 -2.2 0.030
Part-Time Working Experience 0.094 4.1 0.000 0.214 24.5 0.000
Part-Time Working Experience Squared -0.002 -1.3 0.187 -0.004 -10.2 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience 0.133 10.5 0.000 0.118 15.7 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience Squared -0.001 -2.6 0.011 -0.000 -1.2 0.230
Schooling (Ref.: Lower Secondary)
Intermediate 0.285 4.5 0.000 0.208 4.0 0.000
College 0.512 6.1 0.000 0.455 7.1 0.000
Vocational Education (Ref.: None)
Basic Vocational 0.230 2.7 0.006 0.256 4.0 0.000
Higher Vocational 0.435 4.2 0.000 0.303 4.2 0.000
Tertiary 0.593 5.5 0.000 0.635 7.6 0.000
Location in 1989 (Ref.: GDR)
FRG -0.144 -1.3 0.180 -0.130 -1.8 0.078
Abroad -0.286 -1.5 0.145 0.050 0.3 0.757
Migration (Ref.: No)
1st Generation Immigrant -0.084 -0.7 0.478 -0.034 -0.3 0.736
2nd Generation Immigrant 0.091 1.1 0.286 0.064 1.0 0.331
Marital Status (Ref.: Married)
Single -0.059 -0.8 0.398 0.056 1.0 0.314
Divorced -0.075 -0.8 0.452 0.010 0.2 0.861
Widowed -0.520 -1.6 0.117 -0.022 -0.2 0.880
No. of Children < 6 in HH (Ref.: None)
One Child < 6 -0.401 -6.2 0.000 -0.923 -18.4 0.000
Two or More Children < 6 -0.562 -6.9 0.000 -1.603 -21.8 0.000
Self-Rated Health (Ref.: Very Good)
Good -0.019 -0.2 0.812 0.077 1.3 0.210
Satisfactory -0.041 -0.5 0.638 -0.004 -0.1 0.956
Bad -0.310 -3.0 0.003 -0.070 -0.9 0.382
Very Bad -1.015 -6.3 0.000 -0.493 -3.7 0.000
Constant 3.185 5.3 0.000 1.537 3.8 0.000
Mills
Lambda -0.165 -2.2 0.025 -0.002 -0.1 0.949
Federal State Yes Yes
Number of Observations 5858 7367
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: SOEP (v31.1), own calculations.
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Table B.16: OLS regression of logged gross hourly wages (2011)
Male Female
Coeff. t p-value Coeff. t p-value
Age 0.008 0.8 0.431 0.002 0.3 0.785
Age Squared -0.000 -2.2 0.027 -0.000 -2.0 0.046
Part-Time Working Experience -0.034 -5.1 0.000 0.010 3.4 0.001
Part-Time Working Experience Squared 0.002 3.9 0.000 0.000 3.6 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience 0.036 8.3 0.000 0.040 16.1 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience Squared -0.000 -3.6 0.000 -0.000 -6.7 0.000
Schooling (Ref.: Lower Secondary)
Intermediate 0.127 8.3 0.000 0.162 9.2 0.000
College 0.328 14.9 0.000 0.323 14.8 0.000
Vocational Education (Ref.: None)
Basic Vocational 0.076 2.9 0.004 0.075 3.0 0.002
Higher Vocational 0.177 6.1 0.000 0.155 5.8 0.000
Tertiary 0.439 13.5 0.000 0.415 14.2 0.000
Marital Status (Ref.: Married)
Single -0.051 -2.9 0.003 -0.007 -0.4 0.693
Divorced -0.068 -2.7 0.007 0.022 1.3 0.200
Widowed -0.242 -2.0 0.048 -0.034 -0.8 0.435
No. of Children < 6 in HH (Ref.: None)
One Child < 6 -0.002 -0.1 0.887 0.017 0.9 0.344
Two or More Children < 6 0.032 1.5 0.141 0.058 1.6 0.103
Self-Rated Health (Ref.: Very Good)
Good 0.001 0.1 0.955 -0.018 -0.9 0.390
Satisfactory -0.042 -2.0 0.050 -0.066 -3.0 0.003
Bad -0.067 -2.4 0.018 -0.119 -4.2 0.000
Very Bad -0.030 -0.5 0.590 -0.153 -2.4 0.018
Migration (Ref.: No)
1st Generation Immigrant -0.005 -0.2 0.855 0.063 2.0 0.049
2nd Generation Immigrant -0.012 -0.6 0.544 -0.005 -0.3 0.788
Location in 1989 (Ref.: GDR)
FRG 0.122 5.2 0.000 0.080 3.5 0.000
Abroad 0.100 2.1 0.038 -0.043 -0.8 0.416
Constant 1.979 10.9 0.000 1.882 12.8 0.000
Federal State Yes Yes
Adj. R-Square 0.374 0.276
Number of Observations 5318 5745
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: SOEP (v31.1), own calculations.
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Table B.17: Heckman regression of logged gross hourly wages (2011)
Male Female
Coeff. t p-value Coeff. t p-value
Wage Regression
Age 0.019 2.2 0.030 0.007 1.1 0.260
Age Squared -0.000 -3.0 0.002 -0.000 -2.9 0.004
Part-Time Working Experience -0.040 -6.4 0.000 0.007 1.9 0.053
Part-Time Working Experience Squared 0.002 5.4 0.000 0.000 3.5 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience 0.026 5.6 0.000 0.038 13.6 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience Squared -0.000 -3.2 0.001 -0.000 -6.4 0.000
Schooling (Ref.: Lower Secondary)
Intermediate 0.109 6.5 0.000 0.156 8.6 0.000
College 0.289 12.2 0.000 0.324 14.5 0.000
Vocational Education (Ref.: None)
Basic Vocational 0.045 1.7 0.089 0.074 3.0 0.003
Higher Vocational 0.138 4.6 0.000 0.145 5.4 0.000
Tertiary 0.400 12.4 0.000 0.407 13.7 0.000
Location in 1989 (Ref.: GDR)
FRG 0.111 4.4 0.000 0.078 3.4 0.001
Abroad 0.114 2.1 0.036 -0.005 -0.1 0.936
Migration (Ref.: No)
1st Generation Immigrant -0.002 -0.1 0.953 0.041 1.1 0.261
2nd Generation Immigrant -0.011 -0.6 0.577 -0.012 -0.6 0.570
Constant 1.820 11.0 0.000 1.781 13.0 0.000
Selection Regression
Age -0.047 -1.4 0.164 -0.044 -2.0 0.045
Age Squared -0.001 -1.8 0.065 -0.001 -2.5 0.011
Part-Time Working Experience 0.117 4.7 0.000 0.232 24.8 0.000
Part-Time Working Experience Squared -0.002 -1.8 0.075 -0.004 -11.2 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience 0.137 9.8 0.000 0.118 14.7 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience Squared -0.001 -1.6 0.114 -0.000 -0.1 0.915
Schooling (Ref.: Lower Secondary)
Intermediate 0.191 2.6 0.008 0.235 4.3 0.000
College 0.620 6.1 0.000 0.509 7.4 0.000
Vocational Education (Ref.: None)
Basic Vocational 0.335 3.6 0.000 0.229 3.4 0.001
Higher Vocational 0.599 5.0 0.000 0.346 4.4 0.000
Tertiary 0.668 5.4 0.000 0.656 7.2 0.000
Location in 1989 (Ref.: GDR)
FRG 0.102 0.9 0.370 -0.044 -0.6 0.575
Abroad -0.081 -0.4 0.720 -0.031 -0.2 0.859
Migration (Ref.: No)
1st Generation Immigrant 0.107 0.7 0.486 0.065 0.6 0.568
2nd Generation Immigrant -0.012 -0.1 0.902 -0.020 -0.3 0.774
Marital Status (Ref.: Married)
Single -0.130 -1.6 0.102 0.148 2.5 0.014
Divorced -0.195 -1.9 0.057 0.115 1.8 0.066
Widowed -0.527 -1.4 0.149 0.373 2.3 0.022
No. of Children < 6 in HH (Ref.: None)
One Child < 6 -0.190 -2.4 0.015 -0.707 -12.9 0.000
Two or More Children < 6 -0.389 -3.8 0.000 -1.554 -19.5 0.000
Self-Rated Health (Ref.: Very Good)
Good -0.011 -0.1 0.914 -0.081 -1.1 0.261
Satisfactory -0.079 -0.7 0.456 -0.151 -2.0 0.046
Bad -0.489 -4.0 0.000 -0.315 -3.5 0.000
Very Bad -1.271 -7.7 0.000 -0.525 -3.6 0.000
Constant 2.247 3.3 0.001 1.885 4.0 0.000
Mills
Lambda -0.257 -3.8 0.000 -0.007 -0.2 0.845
Federal State Yes Yes
Number of Observations 5596 7109
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: SOEP (v31.1), own calculations.
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Table B.18: OLS regression of logged gross hourly wages (2012)
Male Female
Coeff. t p-value Coeff. t p-value
Age 0.008 0.8 0.400 0.021 2.9 0.004
Age Squared -0.000 -2.3 0.023 -0.000 -4.6 0.000
Part-Time Working Experience -0.021 -3.5 0.000 0.008 2.6 0.009
Part-Time Working Experience Squared 0.001 3.5 0.000 0.000 4.1 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience 0.039 9.6 0.000 0.032 13.0 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience Squared -0.000 -4.2 0.000 -0.000 -2.7 0.007
Schooling (Ref.: Lower Secondary)
Intermediate 0.127 8.2 0.000 0.154 8.7 0.000
College 0.312 14.0 0.000 0.331 15.5 0.000
Vocational Education (Ref.: None)
Basic Vocational 0.117 4.4 0.000 0.133 5.2 0.000
Higher Vocational 0.205 6.9 0.000 0.232 8.4 0.000
Tertiary 0.465 14.3 0.000 0.451 14.9 0.000
Marital Status (Ref.: Married)
Single -0.066 -3.7 0.000 -0.002 -0.1 0.927
Divorced -0.080 -3.2 0.001 0.013 0.7 0.459
Widowed -0.135 -1.0 0.336 -0.045 -1.1 0.273
No. of Children < 6 in HH (Ref.: None)
One Child < 6 0.006 0.4 0.714 0.022 1.2 0.235
Two or More Children < 6 0.035 1.6 0.104 -0.022 -0.6 0.570
Self-Rated Health (Ref.: Very Good)
Good 0.025 1.3 0.208 -0.018 -0.9 0.393
Satisfactory -0.027 -1.3 0.201 -0.069 -3.1 0.002
Bad -0.090 -3.1 0.002 -0.080 -3.0 0.003
Very Bad -0.220 -3.2 0.002 -0.165 -2.6 0.010
Migration (Ref.: No)
1st Generation Immigrant -0.059 -2.2 0.025 0.005 0.2 0.870
2nd Generation Immigrant -0.007 -0.4 0.719 -0.009 -0.5 0.643
Location in 1989 (Ref.: GDR)
FRG 0.124 5.0 0.000 0.116 5.2 0.000
Abroad 0.150 3.4 0.001 0.039 0.9 0.394
Constant 1.934 10.7 0.000 1.528 9.9 0.000
Federal State Yes Yes
Adj. R-Square 0.360 0.274
Number of Observations 5302 5677
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: SOEP (v31.1), own calculations.
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Table B.19: Heckman regression of logged gross hourly wages (2012)
Male Female
Coeff. t p-value Coeff. t p-value
Wage Regression
Age 0.016 1.8 0.075 0.024 3.5 0.001
Age Squared -0.000 -2.7 0.007 -0.000 -5.1 0.000
Part-Time Working Experience -0.037 -5.7 0.000 0.004 1.0 0.309
Part-Time Working Experience Squared 0.002 4.9 0.000 0.000 3.7 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience 0.027 5.7 0.000 0.029 10.2 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience Squared -0.000 -3.1 0.002 -0.000 -2.5 0.013
Schooling (Ref.: Lower Secondary)
Intermediate 0.132 7.5 0.000 0.163 8.6 0.000
College 0.302 12.7 0.000 0.334 14.4 0.000
Vocational Education (Ref.: None)
Basic Vocational 0.032 1.1 0.257 0.113 4.4 0.000
Higher Vocational 0.113 3.5 0.001 0.214 7.5 0.000
Tertiary 0.379 11.2 0.000 0.435 14.0 0.000
Location in 1989 (Ref.: GDR)
FRG 0.139 5.4 0.000 0.118 5.0 0.000
Abroad 0.292 5.0 0.000 0.014 0.2 0.815
Migration (Ref.: No)
1st Generation Immigrant 0.052 1.3 0.186 0.031 0.8 0.426
2nd Generation Immigrant 0.079 2.8 0.006 0.003 0.1 0.892
Constant 1.945 10.4 0.000 1.458 9.5 0.000
Selection Regression
Age 0.022 0.7 0.461 0.025 1.2 0.239
Age Squared -0.001 -3.1 0.002 -0.001 -4.5 0.000
Part-Time Working Experience 0.172 7.9 0.000 0.229 25.0 0.000
Part-Time Working Experience Squared -0.005 -4.2 0.000 -0.005 -12.7 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience 0.128 10.2 0.000 0.101 12.9 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience Squared -0.001 -2.5 0.014 0.000 0.1 0.935
Schooling (Ref.: Lower Secondary)
Intermediate 0.193 3.0 0.002 0.166 3.0 0.002
College 0.445 5.4 0.000 0.402 6.0 0.000
Vocational Education (Ref.: None)
Basic Vocational 0.333 4.2 0.000 0.268 4.1 0.000
Higher Vocational 0.697 6.6 0.000 0.377 5.0 0.000
Tertiary 0.633 6.1 0.000 0.613 7.2 0.000
Location in 1989 (Ref.: GDR)
FRG -0.105 -1.0 0.326 -0.159 -2.0 0.047
Abroad -0.479 -3.0 0.003 -0.549 -4.0 0.000
Migration (Ref.: No)
1st Generation Immigrant -0.976 -10.3 0.000 -0.513 -5.5 0.000
2nd Generation Immigrant -0.920 -14.2 0.000 -0.653 -11.5 0.000
Marital Status (Ref.: Married)
Single 0.029 0.4 0.679 0.131 2.3 0.022
Divorced -0.060 -0.6 0.546 0.277 4.3 0.000
Widowed -0.371 -1.1 0.273 0.051 0.4 0.724
No. of Children < 6 in HH (Ref.: None)
One Child < 6 0.134 2.0 0.048 -0.407 -7.6 0.000
Two or More Children < 6 0.308 3.0 0.003 -1.133 -13.7 0.000
Self-Rated Health (Ref.: Very Good)
Good 0.406 5.6 0.000 0.294 4.5 0.000
Satisfactory 0.403 5.0 0.000 0.203 2.9 0.004
Bad 0.076 0.8 0.441 0.100 1.2 0.225
Very Bad -0.576 -3.7 0.000 -0.444 -3.2 0.001
Constant -0.416 -0.7 0.492 -0.064 -0.1 0.890
Mills
Lambda -0.232 -3.5 0.000 -0.036 -0.8 0.397
Federal State Yes Yes
Number of Observations 5599 6946
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: SOEP (v31.1), own calculations.
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Table B.20: OLS regression of logged gross hourly wages (2013)
Male Female
Coeff. t p-value Coeff. t p-value
Age 0.002 0.2 0.854 0.021 2.7 0.007
Age Squared -0.000 -1.8 0.080 -0.000 -4.1 0.000
Part-Time Working Experience -0.021 -4.1 0.000 0.011 3.7 0.000
Part-Time Working Experience Squared 0.001 3.9 0.000 0.000 2.8 0.005
Full-Time Working Experience 0.042 9.8 0.000 0.032 13.0 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience Squared -0.000 -4.7 0.000 -0.000 -3.0 0.003
Schooling (Ref.: Lower Secondary)
Intermediate 0.129 8.3 0.000 0.181 9.5 0.000
College 0.300 13.9 0.000 0.364 16.1 0.000
Vocational Education (Ref.: None)
Basic Vocational 0.081 3.1 0.002 0.094 3.3 0.001
Higher Vocational 0.173 5.8 0.000 0.176 5.8 0.000
Tertiary 0.453 13.8 0.000 0.406 12.3 0.000
Marital Status (Ref.: Married)
Single -0.072 -4.3 0.000 0.026 1.4 0.148
Divorced -0.077 -3.1 0.002 0.002 0.1 0.933
Widowed -0.080 -0.9 0.395 -0.068 -1.4 0.165
No. of Children < 6 in HH (Ref.: None)
One Child < 6 0.040 2.4 0.017 0.032 1.5 0.125
Two or More Children < 6 0.050 2.1 0.037 0.047 1.2 0.242
Self-Rated Health (Ref.: Very Good)
Good -0.012 -0.6 0.545 -0.000 -0.0 0.993
Satisfactory -0.055 -2.5 0.013 -0.046 -1.9 0.056
Bad -0.104 -3.6 0.000 -0.080 -2.7 0.007
Very Bad -0.247 -3.8 0.000 -0.088 -1.5 0.141
Migration (Ref.: No)
1st Generation Immigrant -0.036 -1.4 0.163 -0.005 -0.2 0.869
2nd Generation Immigrant 0.008 0.4 0.676 -0.016 -0.8 0.435
Location in 1989 (Ref.: GDR)
FRG 0.110 4.8 0.000 0.092 3.8 0.000
Abroad 0.089 2.1 0.038 0.005 0.1 0.912
Constant 2.239 11.0 0.000 1.478 8.7 0.000
Federal State Yes Yes
Adj. R-Square 0.380 0.282
Number of Observations 4635 5011
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: SOEP (v31.1), own calculations.
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Table B.21: Heckman regression of logged gross hourly wages (2013)
Male Female
Coeff. t p-value Coeff. t p-value
Wage Regression
Age 0.014 1.5 0.130 0.019 2.5 0.011
Age Squared -0.000 -2.3 0.021 -0.000 -3.9 0.000
Part-Time Working Experience -0.026 -4.9 0.000 0.005 1.1 0.260
Part-Time Working Experience Squared 0.001 3.7 0.000 0.000 3.3 0.001
Full-Time Working Experience 0.027 6.5 0.000 0.030 10.1 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience Squared -0.000 -4.0 0.000 -0.000 -3.3 0.001
Schooling (Ref.: Lower Secondary)
Intermediate 0.104 6.1 0.000 0.179 9.2 0.000
College 0.249 11.1 0.000 0.356 15.0 0.000
Vocational Education (Ref.: None)
Basic Vocational 0.072 2.9 0.003 0.094 3.7 0.000
Higher Vocational 0.156 5.5 0.000 0.176 6.2 0.000
Tertiary 0.433 14.4 0.000 0.406 13.2 0.000
Location in 1989 (Ref.: GDR)
FRG 0.118 4.8 0.000 0.104 4.3 0.000
Abroad 0.083 1.8 0.074 0.024 0.5 0.647
Migration (Ref.: No)
1st Generation Immigrant -0.020 -0.7 0.506 0.000 0.0 0.998
2nd Generation Immigrant 0.022 1.1 0.268 -0.017 -0.8 0.412
Constant 2.056 11.4 0.000 1.545 9.5 0.000
Selection Regression
Age 0.037 0.8 0.416 -0.023 -0.9 0.380
Age Squared -0.002 -3.6 0.000 -0.001 -2.5 0.011
Part-Time Working Experience 0.080 2.8 0.005 0.220 21.1 0.000
Part-Time Working Experience Squared 0.001 0.6 0.529 -0.004 -10.4 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience 0.168 9.8 0.000 0.112 12.6 0.000
Full-Time Working Experience Squared -0.001 -2.0 0.045 -0.000 -0.5 0.630
Schooling (Ref.: Lower Secondary)
Intermediate 0.399 4.0 0.000 0.186 3.0 0.003
College 0.657 5.2 0.000 0.519 6.7 0.000
Vocational Education (Ref.: None)
Basic Vocational 0.126 1.0 0.302 0.172 2.3 0.020
Higher Vocational 0.354 2.1 0.033 0.317 3.7 0.000
Tertiary 0.595 3.6 0.000 0.458 4.6 0.000
Location in 1989 (Ref.: GDR)
FRG -0.094 -0.6 0.552 -0.172 -1.9 0.059
Abroad 0.219 0.8 0.440 -0.192 -1.1 0.253
Migration (Ref.: No)
1st Generation Immigrant -0.240 -1.2 0.213 0.119 1.0 0.316
2nd Generation Immigrant -0.229 -2.0 0.047 -0.093 -1.3 0.191
Marital Status (Ref.: Married)
Single -0.341 -3.4 0.001 0.139 2.0 0.043
Divorced -0.454 -3.6 0.000 0.185 2.5 0.011
Widowed 7.991 . . 0.021 0.1 0.900
No. of Children < 6 in HH (Ref.: None)
One Child < 6 0.008 0.1 0.945 -0.665 -10.4 0.000
Two or More Children < 6 -0.079 -0.5 0.638 -1.348 -14.1 0.000
Self-Rated Health (Ref.: Very Good)
Good 0.121 0.9 0.384 0.002 0.0 0.980
Satisfactory -0.015 -0.1 0.917 -0.117 -1.3 0.179
Bad -0.481 -3.0 0.002 -0.262 -2.7 0.008
Very Bad -1.254 -6.1 0.000 -0.958 -6.1 0.000
Constant 0.719 0.8 0.438 1.684 2.9 0.003
Mills
Lambda -0.382 -6.6 0.000 -0.076 -1.8 0.080
Federal State Yes Yes
Number of Observations 4832 5948
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: SOEP (v31.1), own calculations.
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